CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
analysis material (see above paragraphs 193 in fine and 196 in fine). It finds
convincing the Government’s clarification that access may only be granted
to “data that constitutes the analysis results” so as to allow strategic
assessments and that the prohibition on using signals intelligence within
foreign intelligence for the purposes of investigating criminal offences fully
applies (see paragraph 214 above).
288. In sum, the grounds upon which bulk interception can be authorised
in Sweden are clearly circumscribed so as to permit the necessary control at
the authorisation and operation stage and ex post facto supervision.
(3) The circumstances in which an individual’s communications may be
intercepted
289. In a bulk interception regime the circumstances in which
communications might be intercepted will be very broad, as it is the
communications bearers that are targeted rather than the devices from which
the communications are sent, or the senders or recipients of the
communications. The circumstances in which communications may be
examined will be narrower, but compared to targeted interception this
category will still be relatively wide, since bulk interception may be used
for a more varied range of purposes, and communications may be selected
for examination by reference to factors other than the identity of the sender
or recipient.
290. As regards interception, signals intelligence conducted on fibre
optic cables may only concern communications crossing the Swedish
border. Also, and regardless of whether the source is airborne or cablebased, communications between a sender and a receiver in Sweden may not
be intercepted (see paragraph 25 above). The Government have admitted,
however, that separating “domestic” from “foreign” traffic is not always
possible in the initial interception stages, as confirmed in the 2011 report of
the Signals Intelligence Committee (see paragraphs 77-80 above; see also
the reports of the Data Protection Authority, paragraphs 75-76 above).
291. It is true that the FRA may also intercept signals as part of its
development activities, which may lead to data not relevant for the regular
foreign intelligence being intercepted. It appears from the report of the
Signals Intelligence Committee (see paragraphs 77-80 above), that signals
intercepted as part of the FRA’s development activities can be used,
including by being “read” and stored, for technological development
purposes regardless of whether they fall within the categories defined under
the eight foreign intelligence purposes.
292. The Court observes, however, that signals intercepted in the context
of the FRA’s development activities do not interest the authorities for the
data they might contain but only for the possibility they afford to analyse
the systems and routes through which information is transmitted. In the
Court’s view, the respondent Government’s explanation about the need for
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