CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
such an arrangement (see paragraph 207 above) is satisfactory. The
examples given (the need to monitor the traffic between certain countries in
order to identify bearers with relevant traffic; the need to identify trends
such as new types of signals and signals protection) appear convincing: the
authorities must be able to react to the evolution in technology and
communication practices and, for that reason, may need to monitor very
large segments of the international signals traffic. The degree of interference
with individuals’ Article 8 rights engendered by such activities appears to
be of a very low intensity having regard to the fact that the data thereby
obtained is not in a form destined to generate intelligence.
293. In addition, it is undisputed that any information that may happen
to emerge from signals intercepted for technological development purposes
cannot be used as intelligence information unless such use is in conformity
with the eight purposes and the applicable tasking directives (see paragraph
79 above). Moreover, development activities can be undertaken only under
a permit issued by the Foreign Intelligence Court and are supervised by the
Inspectorate, including for compliance with the law and the tasking
directives approved by the Foreign Intelligence Court. In these
circumstances the Court is satisfied that the legal framework within which
the FRA’s development activities are conducted contains safeguards capable
of preventing attempts to circumvent the legal restrictions related to the
grounds for which signals intelligence may be used.
294. In view of the above the Court can accept that the legal provisions
on bulk interception in Sweden set out with sufficient clarity the
circumstances in which communications may be intercepted.
(4) The procedure to be followed for granting authorisation
295. Under Swedish law, every signals intelligence mission to be
conducted by the FRA must be authorised in advance by the Foreign
Intelligence Court. Where this procedure might cause delay or other
inconveniences of essential importance for one of the specified purposes of
the signals intelligence, the FRA may itself grant a permit and notify the
Foreign Intelligence Court immediately, which triggers the permit’s rapid
review by that court. The court has the power to modify or revoke it if
necessary (see paragraphs 30-33 above).
296. There is no doubt that the Foreign Intelligence Court meets the
requirement of independence from the executive. In particular, its president
and vice-presidents are permanent judges and, while all members are
appointed by the Government, they have legally defined four-year terms of
office. Also, it is undisputed that neither the Government or Parliament nor
other authorities may interfere with the court’s decision-making, which is
legally binding.
297. As noted by the Chamber, for reasons of secrecy the Foreign
Intelligence Court has never held a public hearing and all its decisions are