CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
(2) The grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised
284. As noted by the Chamber, according to the Signals Intelligence Act
signals intelligence may be conducted only to monitor:
1. external military threats to the country;
2. conditions for Swedish participation in international peacekeeping or
humanitarian missions or threats to the safety of Swedish interests in
the performance of such operations;
3. strategic circumstances concerning international terrorism or other
serious cross-border crime that may threaten essential national
interests;
4. the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
military equipment and other similar specified products;
5. serious external threats to society’s infrastructure;
6. foreign conflicts with consequences for international security;
7. foreign intelligence operations against Swedish interests; and
8. the actions or intentions of a foreign power that are of substantial
importance for Swedish foreign, security or defence policy (see
paragraph 22 above).
285. The preparatory works to the Signal Intelligence Act contain
further elaboration of the meaning of these eight purposes (see paragraph 23
above). In the Court’s view, the level of detail and the terms used
circumscribe the area in which bulk interception may be used with sufficient
clarity, having regard, in particular, to the fact that the impugned regime
aims at uncovering unknown foreign threats whose nature may vary and
evolve with time.
286. The Court observes that while section 4 of the Foreign Intelligence
Act excludes the conduct of signals intelligence within foreign intelligence
to solve tasks in the area of law enforcement or crime prevention, one of the
eight purposes listed above concerns “serious cross-border crime” such as,
according to the preparatory works, “drug or human trafficking of such
severity that it may threaten significant national interests” (see paragraph 23
above).
287. The preparatory works clarify that the aim in this regard is to
survey terrorism or other cross-border crime from the perspective of
Sweden’s foreign and security policy, not to combat criminal activity
operatively (ibid). It is undisputed that information obtained through the
impugned regime of signals intelligence cannot be used in criminal
proceedings. As explained by the Government, tasking directives for signals
intelligence may not be issued to investigate criminal offences and when the
FRA reports intelligence to other agencies it stipulates that the intelligence
may not be used in criminal investigations. In the light of the above, the
Court does not share the concerns expressed by the applicant regarding the
fact that since 1 March 2018 certain police departments may issue tasking
directives and that the Security Police might be granted access to the FRA’s