CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
(iv) The Court’s assessment of the case at hand
(1) Preliminary remarks
279. As noted by the Chamber, it has not been disputed by the parties
that the Swedish signals intelligence activities have a basis in domestic law
(see paragraph 111 of the Chamber judgment). It is further undisputed that
the impugned signals intelligence regime pursues legitimate aims in the
interest of national security by supporting Swedish foreign, defence and
security policy and identifying external threats to the country. Therefore,
following the approach outlined above, it remains to be considered whether
the domestic law was accessible and contained adequate and effective
safeguards and guarantees to meet the requirements of “foreseeability” and
“necessity in a democratic society”.
280. Bulk interception of electronic signals within foreign intelligence in
Sweden is regulated in several pieces of legislation, the main ones being the
Foreign Intelligence Act and the associated Ordinance, the Signals
Intelligence Act and Ordinance, the Foreign Intelligence Court Act and the
FRA Personal Data Processing Act and Ordinance. Additional relevant
provisions on, in particular, some aspects of the functioning of the
applicable supervision mechanisms and remedies are to be found in the
Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate Instructions Ordinance, the Parliamentary
Ombudsmen Instructions Act and the Chancellor of Justice Supervision Act
(see paragraphs 14-74 above).
281. It has not been disputed that all these provisions are publicly
available. The Court would accept, therefore, that the domestic law was
adequately “accessible”.
282. Turning next to the question whether the law contained adequate
and effective safeguards and guarantees to meet the requirements of
“foreseeability” and “necessity in a democratic society”, the Court will
address in subsections (β) – () each of the eight requirements set out in
paragraph 275 above.
283. In the present case it will do so simultaneously with respect to the
interception of the contents of electronic communications and related
communications data. This approach is justified by the fact, undisputed
between the parties, that under the Swedish signals intelligence regime, the
same legal provisions, procedures and safeguards concerning the
interception, retention, examining, use and storing of electronic signals
apply without distinction both to communications data and to the content of
communications. Under the Swedish regime no particular separate issue
arises, therefore, with regard to the use of communications data in bulk
interception operations.
73