IPCO Annual Report 2018
8%
Routine
Urgent
92%
Figure 4: Proportion of urgent and routine interception authorisations, LEAs, 2018
11.45
The records scrutinised at each agency were of a high standard. However, we have
continued to make recommendations in relation to the articulation of collateral intrusion.
Our inspections have previously noted that intrusion, and particularly collateral intrusion,
can change during the life of a warrant, but that this change is not always well articulated
on the casework. As an example, we questioned the language used to characterise
intrusion, which we were concerned might be formulaic and did not always demonstrate
the necessary consideration of the intrusion likely to occur in the case to be authorised.
We have recommended that bespoke considerations should be recorded in every case.
11.46
During previous inspections at one organisation, we raised concerns about delays in
suspension of interception of specific communications. We saw significant improvement
in this area and were pleased to examine records demonstrating timely and appropriate
cessation of interception. However, we still identified a small number of instances where
interception has continued for longer than was necessary. We expect to see further
improvement in this area in 2019.
11.47
The transition to the IPA, and technical developments in recent years, have complicated
the landscape for interception, placing an obligation on each agency to update policies,
processes and systems to meet changing requirements. We have been impressed by the
proactive approach taken by the intercepting agencies to meet this challenge and have a
great deal of confidence that the new processes will ensure a high degree of compliance
with the IPA once warrants are transitioned and the new Act is in force.
Legally privileged material
11.48
The IPA introduces the requirement for the requesting agency to assess the likelihood of
obtaining legally privileged (LPP) or confidential material, and to state if this is the purpose
of the operation. Our inspections scrutinise whether the basis of these assessments is
appropriate and whether the likelihood of obtaining LPP or confidential material is being
accurately described to the Secretary of State and JC considering the warrant. In general,
we have found that the assessments made were accurate and thorough.
11.49
On inspections, we conducted searches on workflow systems, which are used to track and
retain interception material, to identify the existence of LPP and confidential material.
75