76
IPCO Annual Report 2018
At each agency we confirmed that this sensitive material is appropriately handled and
that staff are knowledgeable in relation to the requirements and restrictions under the
IPA. One agency has implemented a new process of regularly reviewing the presence of
potentially privileged material across all live operations. We noted that this comprehensive
approach established a high level of confidence that all relevant material is being identified
and handled appropriately. We have highlighted this approach as best practice to
other agencies.
11.50
Conversely, one of our other inspections found processes that could be developed further
with regards to identifying and tagging LPP material and which would benefit from a more
refined monitoring process. In general, intercepting agencies take a cautious approach
to LPP material, including reviewing any material which has the potential of including
privileged material. However, we did find some instances which did not appear to have
been identified and recommended a review of the system used for highlighting potentially
relevant material. The authority concerned has demonstrated significant improvement in
relation to our recommendations and we do not expect to see these shortcomings at our
inspection in 2019.
11.51
We noted that each agency took a thoughtful and appropriate approach to handling LPP
material. During one inspection, we discussed the definition of individuals working within
the legal profession, which is set out by the IPA and the CoP, to ensure that the scope
is taken to include those working in a legal capacity alongside advocates, solicitors and
barristers. We agreed with the approach taken, which is to treat communications to and
from paralegals, and others working at the direction of and under the supervision of an
advocate, solicitor or barrister, as potentially privileged too.
Additional targeted interception and targeted examination provisions s17(2)
11.52
As detailed in chapter 2, the IPA sets out provisions to obtain warrants to interception
communications for a group of persons, more than one organisation or a set of premises.
The transition from RIPA to IPA was late in the year for LEAs; we intend to inspect their
internal processes and reliance on this provision in 2019.
Communications Data
11.53
Communication data (CD) is used by police and law enforcement agencies across a wide
range of investigations. The majority of applications to acquire CD are made for the
prevention and detection of crime, with the second largest category being in life at risk
situations, such as high-risk missing persons. In more straightforward cases, a single item
of CD may be all that is required, for example to corroborate the account of a witness who
has been sent a malicious or threatening communication. In more complex investigations,
multiple strands of communications data need to be acquired and analysed to establish
patterns of contact and movements between groups of organised criminals or terrorists,
identify potential suspects in a murder or kidnap, or quickly to locate dangerous and
violent offenders.
11.54
The term ‘communications data’ refers to the ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’ and ’how’ of a
communication. It does not include any of the content within a communication such as
text, audio, video or other images and therefore cannot establish what was actually said or
written. Most requests for CD relate to information held by telecommunications operators
(for example, Vodafone, BT and O2), including the time and duration of a communication,
the telephone number or email address of the originator and recipient, or the location
of the device on which the communication was made or received. CD covers electronic