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IPCO Annual Report 2018
enhanced safeguards for sensitive material. We were satisfied that the proposals for new
processes were sufficient to comply with the new CoP.
11.43
Before the IPA came into force, we reviewed all RIPA documentation at the intercepting
agencies. We oversaw the transition process to new warrants with no major issues. In the
wake of the transition, we have re-evaluated our inspection model for interception. We
have previously scrutinised a high proportion of casework, often significantly higher than
other areas of IPCO oversight. With the double lock now in place, however, we do not judge
that this is necessary to ensure the basic level of compliance. This has created capacity for
us to conduct more probing and broader-scoped inspections, including a more practical indepth examination of systems and how interception material is used within each agency.
Example: LEAs use of targeted interception in the course of their investigation:
An LEA becomes aware that an organised crime group is importing drugs to the UK via a
European port. The investigation identifies some members of the group based in Europe and
their contact in the UK. The law enforcement officers discover that this individual is planning
to bring a shipment of drugs into the UK over the weekend and identify a mobile telephone
number for him. The officers are aiming to identify the group’s plans to move the drug
shipment, so that they can seize the load before it comes into the UK and is sold on illegally.
The mobile number is placed on targeted intercept cover by way of urgent authorisation. As
a result of this, and other covert tactics, the location of the illegal operation is identified. Law
enforcement officers take action and the drugs are seized. The officers are able to make a
number of arrests. The operation stopped the drugs from being sold in the UK and a number of
dangerous individuals are now subject to criminal justice outcomes.
11.44
During our inspections, we examined modifications and cancellation documentation and
processes. This enabled us to confirm whether interception was concluded when the
intelligence obtained was no longer necessary and proportionate. There are new processes
under IPA here and this is an area of work in progress, although we have not identified
any issues for concern. We also inspect documentation in relation to urgent applications.
Although these applications are reviewed retrospectively by the JCs, we consider whether
the current records were adequate and test whether the case for applying urgent
procedures is appropriate.