IPCO Annual Report 2018
11.37
In an increasing number of authorities, an on-call CAB officer is responsible for
documenting the conversation in relation to the authorisation. The SAO will independently
take notes of their approval. We have concluded that this approach provides a full and
accurate record of the relevant considerations.
11.38
We continue to see applications in some authorities that are overly lengthy and will
continue to make recommendations in this area. In relation to cancellations we, and
our predecessors, have advised many public authorities that a simple confirmation of
cancellation is not sufficient and we continue to recommend that further notes should be
made on conclusion of any interference, particularly with regard to the product obtained.
11.39
We advised one LEA that they should consider conducting more frequent reviews of the use
of intrusive surveillance techniques. This would reflect the high level of intrusion resulting
from the use of these techniques, as required by the CoP.
Legally privileged material (LPP)
11.40
During one inspection, we found processes for identifying and handling LPP material that
were particularly notable and gave us a high level of confidence that this sensitive material
will be handled appropriately. However, we did note that an AO’s comment at review in
one particular case was lacking; we would expect the AO to comment on the continuing
necessity of obtaining any confidential material. We have recommended that AOs must
comment timeously on the acquisition of confidential information, providing their reasons
for allowing the continuation of the relevant activity, and that any such acquisition should
be notified to IPCO at the start of the next inspection.
Equipment Interference
11.41
The IPA introduces the ability for LEAs to obtain a warrant to conduct equipment
interference (EI) operations. EI might include obtaining data covertly from a computer or
mobile phone, such as the unique identifier for that or other systems data, but cannot
include the interception of ‘live’ communications. This capability is not new to law
enforcement and would previously have been authorised as property interference. Since
implementation on 5 December 2018, we have seen a small number of applications to
conduct EI, which is in line with our previous oversight in this area. The intrusive and
technically complex nature of EI means that it is predominately used by the larger LEAs; our
oversight of these organisations has demonstrated the success of these techniques, which
we are satisfied are being used appropriately. We will inspect the use of EI at the relevant
authorities in 2019, focusing on their use of new techniques and on how the safeguards
introduced by the IPA have been implemented.
Targeted Interception
11.42
Much of our focus in 2018 was to assist and prepare the intercepting agencies30 for the
introduction of IPA and transition from RIPA to IPA. Our objective here was to ensure that
standards of compliance did not slip during the transition and that the approach taken to
IPA warrantry was common across the agencies. The IPA presented an opportunity for us
to work closely with the intercepting agencies to make sure key themes of our inspection
and previous recommendations were adequately addressed from the outset. This included
intrusion into privacy, in particular, and we also focused on the implementation of the
30 As well as MI5, GCHQ, SIS and the MOD, the intercepting agencies are Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Metropolitan Police
Service, National Crime Agency, Police Scotland, Police Service of Northern Ireland.
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