argument to the contrary. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister could readily
deal with this issue particularly bearing in mind Section 19 of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act which requires that interception matters shall be kept
secret.
54. What is more difficult to understand is the basis of opposition apart from
self-interest or, possibly, lack of understanding, in the maintenance of a privilege
enjoyed by nobody else, given that there are perfectly adequate safeguards in
place that serve MPs and non-MPs alike. In the conversations that I have had with
Ministers and members of Parliament on this issue, I have not been able to find
any logical, and, certainly not, any principled objection to change apart from selfinterest. After this issue received some media publicity earlier this year, a number
of people have spoken to me, both within and outside legal and intelligence
circles, and the reaction has been one of astonishment and incredulity that this
situation should be allowed to continue.
55. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other country in the world that
provides the privilege to its elected representatives and Peers to be immune from
having their communications lawfully intercepted with the accompanying
advantage that they may be immune from criminal investigation and prosecution.
56. The Wilson Doctrine applies to MPs and Peers but cannot apply to Members
of the European Parliament or Members of the Scottish Parliament or Members
of the Welsh or Northern Ireland Assemblies. It is plainly right that it should not
but it provides a striking illogicality.
57. In my view the Doctrine flies in the face of our Constitution and is wrong.
I do not think that it provides MPs with additional protection. I think in fact that
it is damaging to them.
Errors
RIPA Part I Chapter I: Interception
58. A significant number of interception errors and breaches have been reported
to me during the course of the period of this report – 66 in all. This reflects an
increase of 22 on the 45 errors reported during 2004. The number of errors is
unacceptably high. It should, however, be stressed that, as any reader of this report
will readily understand, there have been periods of time in the course of the last
eighteen months when the relevant Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies
have been working under extreme pressure, with some employees working round
the clock. At times such as these it is more likely, and more understandable, that
mistakes may be made. By way of example, details of some of these errors are
recorded below. It is very important from the point of view of the public that I
stress that none of the breaches or errors were deliberate, that all were caused by
human error or procedural error or by technical problems and that in every case
either no interception took place or, if there was interception, the product was
destroyed immediately on discovery of the error. The most common cause of error
tends to be the simple transposition of numbers by mistake e.g., 1945 instead of
1954. The examples that I give are typical of the totality and are anonymous so
far as the targets are concerned. Full details of all the errors and breaches are set
out in the Confidential Annex.
59. The Home Office reported one error which occurred in relation to the
revalidation of an emergency warrant modification. The revalidation request was
received in the Home Office on the afternoon before it expired at midnight.
However, it was not actioned until the following day as the request was not
highlighted as being a revalidation of an emergency warrant modification which
expired on that day and therefore required urgent attention. Despite this the
telephone line was not cancelled and remained active until revalidated. No
product was received between the expiry time and the time the modification was
revalidated.
60. The Scottish Executive also reported one error where a warrant schedule
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