contained, through a typing error, an incorrect telephone number: a single digit
within the number being incorrectly inserted. The Scottish Executive has
reviewed its processes with staff being reminded of the steps that must be taken
to ensure accuracy in all warrantry paperwork.
61. The Northern Ireland Office reported nine errors of which four are
highlighted below. In two separate cases, warrants were properly obtained against
their respective targets but product revealed that the telephone numbers quoted on
the warrants were incorrect and that the telephones were not, in fact, used by the
intended targets. All product was destroyed.
62. In two other separate cases, the telephone numbers on their respective
warrants contained incorrect digits. In one of the cases, no product was obtained:
in the other the product was destroyed. In both cases, the correct numbers were
added to their respective warrants.
63. Seventeen errors were reported to me by GCHQ of which five are
highlighted below. The first case arose out of avoidable human error. A target
whose calls were being intercepted lawfully was found to be in the United
Kingdom. The target’s change of location escaped the attention of the analyst who
failed to take any action either to stop listening to the calls or obtain further
authorisation. None of the calls were transcribed and all have been deleted.
64. The second error occurred in relation to a request made of GCHQ to
intercept the communications of an individual whilst he was overseas. The target
traveled overseas but returned the same day. When he left the UK his details were
added to GCHQ’s databases for his communications to be intercepted.
Unfortunately, it was not removed on his return to the UK and remained on the
database for a further three weeks. During this period one item of 2 seconds
duration was intercepted but was deleted as being of no interest. GCHQ will
devise procedures to help prevent a recurrence.
65. Another similar error occurred during the report period. A customer
requested GCHQ to intercept the communications of an individual whilst he was
overseas. Once he had left the UK, the target’s details were added to GCHQ’s
databases for his communications to be intercepted. Unfortunately the number
was not removed from the database for five days following the target’s arrival
back in the UK. During this time fifty items were selected, half of which had been
listened to. No calls were transcribed. Again, GCHQ will devise procedures to
help prevent a recurrence.
66. The fourth error arose out of a mistake by a new member of staff at GCHQ.
The agency was asked for assistance in providing information on an individual
who was in the UK. No interception was requested. A newly-deployed analyst
entered the individual’s details on GCHQ’s targeting database for information
purposes only. In error the target’s details were entered onto GCHQ’s databases
for interception. On discovery of this action the address was immediately
removed. Fortunately, no material had been selected. This was a human error. The
analyst was moved from this section and no longer uses the targeting database.
67. In the fifth case, GCHQ entered the details of a target known to be overseas
into databases in order to intercept his communications. Unfortunately, when
requesting that this number be intercepted, the GCHQ analyst mistyped the
number by transposing two digits within the correct number. No intercept
resulted; either the number was not active or had not been allocated to a
subscriber. In the absence of intercept, GCHQ did not investigate further as this
may have involved an unnecessary invasion of privacy. The analysts have been
reminded of the importance of double-checking the accuracy of the telephone
numbers.
68. The Security Service reported seventeen errors. Brief details of six are
highlighted below. The first case relates to postal intercepts against three
addresses. On the vacation of the targets from two premises, the addresses should
have been deleted from the warrant. This has now been done. No mail for
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