iv.
It is important to appreciate that in reality it is impossible to achieve
the interception of a telephone conversation by a Government Agency
without a Warrant and the safeguards attached to it. So those who
support the retention of this particular privilege have nothing to fear
unless they are engaging in terrorism or serious crime.
v.
The interception of communications is the most important
investigative tool in the investigation of serious crime, such as fraud,
drug smuggling, the downloading of child pornography, sexual
offences with minors and perjury. Of course, I do not think that
Members of Parliament are engaging in serious crime and terrorism.
Indeed I have the greatest respect for our democratic institutions.
However to maintain that no MP or Peer ever has or ever will engage
in serious crime is absurd.
vi.
Nonetheless it is clear to me that a number of Ministers and many MPs
from the Speaker of the House of Commons downwards, who I have
spoken to on this subject, are determined to maintain this privileged
status.
52. There are three further important points to be made:
i.
The Security Services and Law Enforcement Agencies are not
remotely interested in acquiring personal information about Members
of Parliament or, indeed, other citizens, except in strict observance of
their statutory functions. Moreover, for the reasons set out above, it
would not be possible for them to do so. I can say this with confidence
after six years in my current post. It is also very important to remember
that most investigations of serious crime are carried out at least in
substantial part, by interception.
ii.
It is in truth all but impossible for an intercepting agency to intercept
telephone conversations unlawfully by deliberate means. Interception
of the communications of a citizen by an intercepting agency can only
take place with a Warrant based on serious crime or national security
grounds. Before a Warrant can be granted, it must be shown that there
is evidence already in place that the person concerned is involved with
serious crime or terrorism. It has to be considered by senior
departmental officials and, if deficient, it is rejected at that stage. It
then goes to the Secretary of State. It would, in my experience, be
inconceivable and exceedingly dangerous for him or her to sign a
Warrant on improper grounds. And, finally, in this context, it will be
seen by the Commissioner who must ensure that no improper
interception takes place. It is also worth noting that since 1994: a.) all
three intelligence agencies operate under statute; b.) they are overseen
by the parliamentarians of the Intelligence and Security Committee
and the Intelligence Services Commissioner both of whom are
independent of government; c.] they are subject to a complaints
procedure under the independent Investigatory Powers Tribunal; and
that d.] Sections 2(2)(b) and 4(2)(b) of the Intelligence Services Act
1989 and Section 2(2)(b) of the Security Service Act prevent those
services from taking “any action to further the interests of any political
party”.
53. When he made his statement in the House of Commons on 13 March 2006,
the Prime Minister was kind enough to make reference to the advice that I had
given to him to the effect that the Wilson Doctrine was at the present time in the
changed circumstances unsustainable. I understand, and have sympathy with the
Prime Minister in the circumstances in which he was placed, namely strong
opposition within the Cabinet and in the House of Commons to any change in the
current position. I recognise that ending the Doctrine might put pressure on the
Prime Minister to disclose whether the prohibition of telephone tapping of
Members of Parliament has been maintained since 1966 and, if not, to make a
statement on the circumstances of its ending. I do not consider that this is any
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