crime and safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Of
course, it would theoretically be possible to circumvent this procedure, but
there are extensive safeguards in place to ensure that this cannot happen, and
I am satisfied that it does not. I consider it an important part of my oversight
role to ensure that these safeguards are in place and that they are observed.
The Extent of Interception: General
16. As in the past, the Annex to this Report contains a summary of the
numbers of warrants in force at the end of 2003 and those issued throughout
the course of the year by the Home Secretary and the First Minister in
Scotland. The great majority of warrants issued in England and Wales and
Scotland remain related to the prevention and detection of serious crime. The
continuing incidence of serious and organised crime and an increased facility to
counter it are the main cause of the larger numbers of warrants. The
significantly high level of warrants sought each year, with a corresponding level
of workload for the Secretaries of State and on the part of the relevant
agencies, clearly calls for the exercise of vigilant supervision. I can report that
the level of scrutiny has been, and continues to be, generally well maintained.
Although the number of errors reported to me during 2003 is the same as that
recorded in my Report last year, I still remain concerned about its level. It is
inevitable that in any detailed, technical human activity errors may occur.
Nevertheless I have impressed on the agencies the need to eliminate errors or,
at least, to reduce them to an absolute minimum. The agencies are very aware
of the importance of this, and on each occasion where an error has occurred
they review their procedures with a view to ensuring that the same error does
not recur. Keeping errors to a minimum is one of the reasons for having
safeguards in place. I will, of course, continue to monitor the system to satisfy
myself that every effort is being made to prevent such recurrences and seeking
full explanations if they do.
Safeguards
17. Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to the dissemination,
disclosure, copying, storage and destruction etc., of intercepted material. These
sections of the legislation require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted
by each of the agencies and for those safeguards to be approved by the
Secretary of State. This has been done. My advice and approval was sought for
the documents and I am approached to agree amendments to the safeguards
when they are updated in light of technical and administrative
developments.
18. The requirements of sections 15 and 16 of RIPA are vital. Those involved
in the interception process are well aware of the invasive nature of this work
and care is taken to ensure that intrusions of privacy are kept to the minimum.
I am satisfied that the agencies are operating effectively within their
safeguards.
Communications data
19. Chapter II of Part I of RIPA applies to the acquisition and disclosure of
communications data. Section 57 of the Act requires me to keep under review
the exercise and performance by the persons on whom these powers and duties
are conferred or imposed. The delay in bringing into force Chapter II of Part I
is well documented. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications
Data) Order 2003 was made on 5 December 2003 and came into force on 5
January 2004 (Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 3172), and so falls outside the
scope of this Annual Report.
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