warrants are necessary for the authorised purposes, and that what is proposed
is proportionate. If the Secretary of State wishes to have further information in
order to be satisfied that he or she should grant the warrant then it is requested
and given. Outright and final refusal of an application is comparatively rare,
because the requesting agencies and the senior officials in the Secretary of
State’s Department scrutinise the applications with care before they are
submitted for approval. However, the Secretary of State may refuse to grant
the warrant if he or she considers, for example, that the strict requirements of
necessity or proportionality are not met, and the agencies are well aware that
the Secretary of State does not act as a “rubber stamp”.
9.
During 2003 I also visited the communications service providers (CSPs),
that is to say the Post Office and major telephone companies. Each of the CSPs
employs personnel who are responsible for the execution of interception of
communications warrants. They have acquired expertise in their field and,
again, in the course of my visits, I was impressed by the care, interest and
dedication of these employees to their work in this sensitive area and with their
understanding of the need at all times to comply with the safeguards imposed
on them. The CSPs have a vital role to play in this field, and I am sure that it is
of first importance, if any change in the law is proposed which may affect them
and their staff, that they should be consulted and their views and concerns
taken into account.
10. On 12 May 2003 I gave evidence to Mr Justice Butterfield in relation to
his enquiry to review current practices and procedures relating to the
disclosure, associated investigation techniques and case management in HM
Customs and Excise’s criminal cases.
11. In May 2003 I was sent an updated copy of the GCHQ compliance
documentation, and asked to approve it which I did: it is through the measures
described in this documentation that the safeguards referred to in RIPA
paragraphs 17 – 18 are maintained.
12. In September and November 2003 I visited two GCHQ facilities and
inspected the work relevant to my role as Commissioner. I had the opportunity
to see at first hand the work carried out at both sites, to talk to those in charge
and to a number of staff. The visits were extremely informative and enabled me
to see GCHQ’s interception process in the round. I observed how the work is
monitored, and I was satisfied that the relevant safeguards are being complied
with. The work being done at both sites is invaluable for the purposes set out in
section 5(3) of the Act.
13. In November 2003 I met, through the offices of the Intelligence and
Security Committee, members of the German G10 Kommission to discuss
matters of mutual interest and concern in the area of interception.
14. In my past Reports I have highlighted the possible suspicions that some
members of the public may have that their telephone conversations are being
unlawfully intercepted by the security, intelligence or law enforcement
agencies. Through all aspects of my continuing oversight work I am as satisfied
as it is possible to be that deliberate unlawful interception of communications
of the citizen does not take place. I say “deliberate” because on rare occasions
technical errors do occur which may render an interception unlawful in which
case the product, if any has been received, from the interception is always
destroyed.
15. By law, the interception of an individual’s communications can take place
only after a Secretary of State has granted a warrant and the warrant can be
granted on strictly limited grounds as set out in section 5 of RIPA, essentially
in the interests of national security, the prevention and detection of serious
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