55. The Scottish Executive reported to me an erroneous termination of an
intercept by a CSP. The CSP have acknowledged that the line was cancelled by
them in error and that the action resulted in product not being available for a
considerable length of time. The CSP has reviewed its systems monitoring
procedure and revised their “housekeeping” practices to ensure that a similar
situation does not recur. The Scottish Executive also reported a further eight
errors by CSPs. The main reasons for these occurring include the wrong
technical applications being applied by the CSPs to the intercepting facility,
failure to activate a line facility, and the incorrect programming of a number
into the computer system.
Conclusion
56. As I highlighted in my Report last year, the interception of
communications is an invaluable weapon for the purpose set out in section 5(3)
of RIPA and, in particular, in the battle against terrorism and serious crime. The
task of the agencies working in this field has become more difficult and
complex as a result of the proliferation of mobile telephones and the greater
sophistication of criminals and terrorists. RIPA brought the legislation up to
date in the light of new developments in technology in the communications
industry. The law was simplified in relation to the implementation of warrants,
the issue of emergency warrants, their duration and their discharge. These
changes have increased the efficiency of the enforcement agencies and the
speed with which, in appropriate circumstances, they may act whilst in each
case being covered by section 15 safeguards.
57. It is my view that in 2003, as before, interception played a vital part in the
battle against terrorism and serious crime, and one that would not have been
achieved by other means. I am also satisfied that Ministers and the intelligence
and law enforcement agencies carry out this task diligently and in accordance
with the law.
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