46. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) reported three errors to
me. All three errors relate to the late cancellation of interception warrants in
respect of three separate operations. In all three cases the CSPs were instructed
to cease interception; however, MPSB failed to make a prompt application to
the Home Office to seek cancellation of the three warrants. MPSB have
acknowledged that their failure to act was due to human error and a lack of
robustness in their current operating systems. I have been assured that systems
have been put in place to ensure no recurrence in the future. MPSB have
confirmed that they did not receive any intercepted product in any of the three
cases after the instructions to cease interception were given to the CSPs.
47. HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) reported four errors. The first error
occurred when digits in the intercepted telephone number were transposed.
Although the application to the Home Office for a warrant contained the
correct telephone number the number actually intercepted by the CSP was
incorrect by one digit. Checking procedures appear to have failed to spot the
error. These have now been tightened.
48. The second error occurred when a new computer system installed in
HMCE to manage its warrantry processes mistakenly put a case identifier on a
new warrant that had been previously applied to a cancelled warrant. HMCE
have been in contact with the company who developed the software for
managing their warrantry and has asked them to build a safeguard so that, in
future, case identifiers cannot be placed onto cancelled warrants.
49. In the third case, a typing error in the processing of HMCE’s
documentation resulted in the wrong surname being used on the warrant: a
wrong letter was used in the surname. On discovering the error the Home
Office was notified and an application was re-submitted in the proper name. No
illegal interception took place.
50. The fourth error occurred when HMCE obtained two warrants for two
mobile telephone numbers provided by Dutch police who were running a
parallel investigation. It transpired that the mobile numbers were incorrect in
that an additional digit was included. The additional digit meant that the
numbers would not be capable of interception. HM Customs and Excise have
assured me that there has been no collateral intrusion in respect of any third
parties.
51. The National Criminal Intelligence Service reported one error where a
warrant contained an incorrect telephone number: individual digits within the
number being transposed incorrectly. Interception ceased immediately the
error was discovered: no product was intercepted. NCIS acknowledge that this
was clearly a case of simple human error and they will continue to review their
procedures to ensure that future recurrences are minimised.
52.
No errors were reported by the Ministry of Defence.
53. I now turn to give two examples of the eleven errors made by the
communications service providers (CSPs).
54. The first, reported by the Home Office, concerns a CSP who, when testing
its new data interception capability, intercepted an e-mail account owned by
the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC). Whilst this was an
acceptable and necessary technical activity agreed with NTAC, part of the
equipment failed to function correctly during the test. The consequence of the
failure left the account open to access from a non-NTAC user. A detailed
technical solution was identified and implemented with the material received
by NTAC during the testing having been destroyed.
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