security and the prevention or detection of serious crime. Of course, it would
theoretically be possible to circumvent this procedure, but there are in place
extensive safeguards to ensure that this cannot happen, and it is an important
part of my work to ensure that these are in place, and that they are observed.
Furthermore, any attempt to get round the procedures which provide for legal
interception would, by reason of the safeguards, involve a major conspiracy
within the agency concerned which I believe would, for practical purposes, be
impossible. I am as satisfied as it is possible to be that deliberate unlawful
interception of communications of the citizen does not take place. I say
“deliberate” because on rare occasions technical errors do occur which may
render an interception unlawful in which case the product, if any has been
received, from the interception is always destroyed.
The Extent of Interception: General
11. As in the past, the Annex to this Report contains a summary of the
numbers of warrants in force at the end of 2001 and those issued throughout the
course of the year by the Home Secretary and the Scottish First Minister. The
great majority of warrants issued in England and Wales and Scotland remain
related to the prevention and detection of serious crime. The continuing
incidence of serious and organised crime and an increased facility to counter it
are the main cause of the larger numbers of warrants. The significantly high
level of warrants sought each year, with a corresponding level of workload for
the Secretaries of State and on the part of the relevant Agencies, clearly calls
for the exercise of vigilant supervision. I can report that the level of scrutiny has
been and continues to be generally well maintained. However I remain
concerned about the number of errors reported during the year. It is inevitable
that in any detailed, technical human activity errors may occur. I have
impressed on the agencies the need to eliminate errors or, at least, to reduce
them to an absolute minimum. The agencies are very aware of the importance
of this, and on each occasion where an error has occurred they review their
procedures with a view to ensuring that the same error does not recur. Keeping
errors to a minimum is one of the reasons for having the safeguards in place. I
will, of course, continue to monitor the system to satisfy myself that every effort
is being made to prevent such recurrences and seeking full explanations where
these systems fail.
The Extent of Interception: Scotland
12. There was some criticism of the level of the interception of
communications in the year 2000 in Scotland in the Scottish Parliament and the
Scottish media in February 2002. My inspections in Scotland show quite clearly
that warrants for interception there have been granted by Ministers in Scotland
only in cases which properly fall squarely within the definition of serious crime
and within the upper echelons of that definition.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000:
impact of the legislation on the work of warrantry
units in government departments and the security,
intelligence and law enforcement agencies
13. During my visits to the security, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies I have discussed the impact that the implementation of RIPA has had
on their work. As before, I have highlighted in the confidential annex some
examples of the agencies’ experience of the new legislation. I think it would also
be helpful for me to give in this part of my Report a more detailed account of
the impact on the agencies of the legislation as perceived by them.
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