6. In accordance with these duties I have visited the Security Service, the
Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, the National Criminal Intelligence Service,
the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, the Strathclyde Police, the
Police Service for Northern Ireland (formerly the Royal Ulster Constabulary),
HM Customs and Excise, the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Scottish
Executive and the Ministry of Defence at least twice during 2001. I have been
very impressed by the quality and the dedication and the enthusiasm of the
personnel carrying out this work on behalf of the government and the people of
the United Kingdom. They have a detailed understanding of the legislation and
strive assiduously to comply with the statutory criteria and, in my view, there is
very little, if any, danger that an application which is defective in substance will
be placed before the Secretary of State. Where errors have occurred, which I
refer to below (and in detail in the confidential annex) these have been errors of
detail and not of substance. Where errors occur they are reported to me and if
there is any product it is immediately destroyed. The agencies have made
available to me everything that I have wished to see or hear about in conformity
with the statutory duty placed upon them. They welcome the oversight of the
Commissioner, both from the point of view of seeking his advice, which they do
quite frequently, and as a reassurance to the general public that their activities
are overseen by an independent person who has held high judicial office. I am
also left in no doubt as to their anxiety to comply with the law. In a case of doubt
or difficulty, they do not hesitate to consult me.
7. Prior to each visit to the agencies I obtain a complete list of the warrants
issued or renewed since my previous visit. I then select, largely at random, a
sample of warrants for close inspection. In the course of my visit I satisfy myself
that the warrants satisfy the requirements of RIPA, that proper procedures
have been followed, that the relevant safeguards and codes of practice have
been followed. In the course of my visits I review each of the files and the
supporting documents and discuss the cases directly with the operational
officers concerned. I can view the product of the interception. It is important to
ensure that the facts justify the use of interception in each case and those
concerned with interception fully understand the safeguards and the codes of
practice.
8. During the year I have seen the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Defence and
the First Minister for Scotland. Again, I have been impressed with the care that
they take with their warrantry work to ensure that warrants are issued only in
appropriate cases and, in particular, in ensuring that the conduct authorised is
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by the interception.
9. I have also visited the Communications Service Providers (CSPs), that is to
say the Post Office (now known as Consignia) and all the major telephone
companies. In the course of my visits, I was impressed by the care, interest and
dedication of their employees to their work in this field, and their
understanding of the need at all times to comply with the safeguards imposed
on them. This is of the greatest importance.
10. Many members of the public are suspicious about the interception of
communications, and some believe that their own conversations are subject to
unlawful interception by the security, intelligence or law enforcement agencies.
To an extent this may be understandable, because people do tend to be
suspicious of what takes place in secret, and are worried by the “big brother”
concept. Interception for lawful purposes, of course, and inevitably, takes place
in secret. In my oversight work I am conscious of these concerns. However, I am
as satisfied as I can be that the concerns are, in fact, unfounded. Interception of
an individual’s communications can take place only after a Secretary of State
has granted a warrant and the warrant can be granted on strictly limited
grounds set out in Section 5 of RIPA, essentially the interests of national
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