83. Two errors are attributable to NCIS. In both cases the telephone numbers
that had been targeted and intercepted turned out to be the wrong numbers.
Human error was responsible. In the first case the mistake was one digit in an
eleven-digit number and in the second, a wrong number was provided to the
National Crime Squad by an overseas police force.
84. I now turn to give four examples of the fifteen errors made by the
communication service providers (CSP). The first occurred when a CSP
employee wrongly assumed that a warrant had been signed and made a
connection to the targeted line. Having discovered the breach the Security
Service suspended the check on its internal systems and notified the CSP of the
error. The calls were not transcribed and the intercept product was destroyed. I
understand that the CSP has admitted the mistake, which was caused by human
error, and will endeavour to prevent it from happening again.
85. The second case involved an error made by members of a CSP who made
preliminary arrangements to provide intercept of a telephone line at the same
time as an application for the issue of a schedule to authorise this intercept was
being processed by the Home Office. Although a connection had been made no
product was received by the targeting agency.
86. In the third example product from a Security Service interception warrant
was incorrectly addressed and delivered by a CSP secure courier service to the
Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB). On opening the envelope and
discovering that the material was not for them the MPSB contacted the CSP
and the product was resealed and returned to the CSP for onward transmission
to the correct agency.
87. The final example concerns a modification which was signed to delete a
number on a line that was unproductive. The CSP was telephoned by the FCO
and informed of the modification. The CSP interpreted the telephone call as an
instruction to provide interception of that number, which they duly did, and
telephoned GCHQ to confirm this. Realising what had happened, GCHQ
contacted the CSP who immediately removed the line from their interception
system. No interception took place. This is the first error of this type
experienced; it arose from a verbal misunderstanding between the CSP and the
FCO and occurred during a very busy period. The matter has been discussed
with all those involved and the importance of making telephone instructions
very clear has been stressed.
88. The remaining eleven errors fall into three categories. There were six
cases where unauthorised product was received by the agencies due to
technical and/or engineering problems at the CSPs. All product received by the
agencies was immediately destroyed. In a further three cases, interception was
set up on wrong telephone numbers by the relevant CSPs. The product relating
to the incorrect numbers was destroyed immediately and no material
disseminated in any form. The remaining two cases concerned two CSPs who
supplied intercept material to the targeting agencies for new numbers that had
not been included on a modifications to the warrants’ schedules. All unlawful
product received was destroyed.
89. No errors were reported by the Secret Intelligence Service, the
Metropolitan Police Special Branch and HM Customs and Excise. No specific
errors have been reported by the Ministry of Defence, but they have reported
one technical breach of RIPA which I have dealt with in more detail in the
Confidential Annex.
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