intended changing his mobile from one CSP network to another. The
appropriate warrant was modified to delete the old number and to add the new
number. The new intercept did not produce any product during the first few
days of its operation. The mobile telephone was not being used and therefore
no calls were intercepted and transcribed. It also transpired that the telephone
number had been mis-reported by the source of the intelligence and that one
digit was wrong. Intercept of the mobile was suspended immediately and the
warrant modified to operate against the correct mobile telephone number.
Although everyone involved in this case acted in good faith, consideration is
being given to whether routine procedures can be put in place to confirm the
subscriber to a mobile telephone whenever that information is available.
79. The second was a report of a breach of security for which the Northern
Ireland Office was not responsible and which is detailed more fully in the
confidential annex. This is currently the subject of an investigation by the
Belfast Special Branch.
80. The National Criminal Intelligence Service reported three errors. The
first case involved the targeting of “third criminal” whose services were thought
to be used in a kidnap. A warrant was obtained for a mobile telephone with no
subscriber details. When the first product of the interception was received it
was clear the target under interception was not the “third criminal”. A check
revealed an error had been made and the facility was immediately suspended
then cancelled. No product was recorded. The correct facility was then
acquired by way of an urgent modification. An investigation revealed that the
wrong telephone number had been forwarded within NCIS. NCIS has inserted
an additional checkback process in their procedures.
81. The second error concerned the warrant issued to target a known
criminal. The warrant authorised the interception of the target’s home and
mobile telephone numbers as well as another telephone number used by the
target. From this latter interception NCIS officers became aware of a new
mobile telephone number for the target. A modification to the new warrant to
add this mobile telephone was obtained and interception commenced.
However, it became clear from the first call intercepted that the telephone was
not in the possession of the target. An investigation revealed that the telephone
number of one of the investigating police officers was forwarded to be included
in the modification rather than the target’s number. The interception was
suspended and monitoring ceased. The wrong number was cancelled with the
PTO and the correct number added to the warrant. Unlawful interception
occurred for less than one day and arose out of human error. Arrangements
have been put in hand within NCIS to ensure no recurrence of similar errors.
82. In the third case, an interception warrant was obtained for a mobile
telephone of a known criminal. However, shortly after interception
commenced it became clear that the target had discarded the telephone in
favour of another. The line was rightly cancelled with the CSP. The Home
Office was advised and with a request that the interception be cancelled. It was
indicated that the operational team would make another application when a
new facility was identified. A new number was subsequently identified and with
the agreement of the Home Office a Director’s modification was issued. A
ratification report was subsequently submitted to the Home Office and it was at
this point that it was discovered that the warrant had been cancelled as a result
of an earlier report from NCIS. The new facility was immediately cancelled
with the CSP, a fresh warrant issued and lawful interception commenced. I
understand that this breach has discussed between the Home Office and NCIS
and in future where a warranted target is not the subject of current interception
the report will be specifically titled to ensure that the problem does not recur.
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