Communications data
58. Chapter II of Part I of RIPA applies to the acquisition and disclosure of
Communications Data. Section 57 of the Act requires me to keep under review
the exercise and performance by the persons on whom they are conferred or
imposed these powers and duties. Chapter II of Part I is not yet in force. It was
anticipated that it would come into force in October 2001, but for various
reasons the commencement date has had to be postponed. When it does come
into force it will involve a very substantial increase in my duties as the
Commissioner. In addition to the Ministries and Agencies that I oversee at
present in relation to the interception of communications it is anticipated that
64 Police Authorities and an as yet uncertain number of Public Authorities will
be authorised to acquire and disclose communications data. Oversight will of
necessity involve visits to those concerned with this work and a very
considerable extension of the Commissioner’s work. It will not be possible for
me to undertake this work without assistance and the extent and nature of the
assistance that I will require is being considered by the Home Office in
consultation with me and my staff.
Prisons
59. I have been asked by the Home Office, and have agreed in principle, to
oversee the interception of communications in prisons. This has not come into
effect in the year 2001 which is the subject of this Report but will come into
effect in 2002 with a corresponding increase in the volume of work, the
provision of assistance to me in carrying out oversight, and an increase in my
staff.
Staffing of the Secretariat
60. In my last Report I said that the situation in relation to my staff had been
unsatisfactory for a period of time. I am happy to be able to report that this
problem has been cured. Much of the backlog of work has been cleared and I
believe that the staffing of the Commissioners and the Tribunal is now working
smoothly.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Northern
Ireland Office warrants
61. In paragraphs 10 - 12 of my predecessor’s 1995 Report, he set out the
reasons for not disclosing the number of warrants issued by the Foreign
Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the main part of
the Report. I take this opportunity to outline the reasons behind this decision.
62. This practice is based on paragraph 121 of the Report of the Committee of
Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into the interception of communications
and chaired by Lord Birkett. The Birkett Committee thought that public
concern about interception might to some degree be allayed by the knowledge
of the actual extent to which interception had taken place. After carefully
considering the consequences of disclosure upon the effectiveness of
interception as a means of detection, they decided that it would be in the public
interest to publish figures showing the extent of interception, but to do so only
in a way which caused no damage to public interest. They went on to say:
“We are strongly of the opinion that it would be wrong for figures to be
disclosed by the Secretary of State at regular or irregular intervals in the
future. It would greatly aid the operation of agencies hostile to the state if
they were able to estimate even approximately the extent of the
interceptions of communications for security purposes.”
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