Service of warrants
52. The main extra responsibility for National Criminal Intelligence Service is
the service of warrants. This function was devolved from the Home Office.
53. Another side effect of the change is that agencies now have to keep copies
of the warrants, application documents and renewal documents. These
documents often contain intercept product and have to be shown to the
prosecutor on request. This allows them access to intercept product that they
did not have before.
Overall
54. The responses of the Agencies are, I think, interesting and enlightening.
Whereas, of course, there were safeguards in place under IOCA, and the same
care was taken with the warrantry process as now under RIPA, the latter
together with the Human Rights Act have caused the Agencies to review all
their procedures. There are now in place Safeguards and a Code of Practice
which ensure, so far as it is possible, that the principles and practice laid down in
the two Acts are complied with. The Code of Practice was introduced into
Parliament on the 8th May 2002 and debated on the 21st May, and came into
force on 1st July 2002. In the Parliamentary debates it was generally welcomed,
in particular the clarification of the meaning of the economic well being of the
United Kingdom.
55. I agree with the views expressed by the Agencies that RIPA and the
Human Rights Act, whilst to some extent increasing the paperwork and
manpower involved, have modernised the warrantry process, reinforced the
concept of proportionality, and, whilst not in any way decreasing the efficiency
of the interception of communications process, has strengthened the system for
the protection of the rights of the citizen.
Safeguards
56. Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to dissemination,
disclosure, copying, storage, and destruction etc., of intercepted material.
These sections require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted by each of
the agencies referred to earlier in this Report and for those safeguards to be
approved by the Secretary of State. This had been done. I have been impressed
by the care with which these documents have been drawn up, reviewed and
updated in the light of technical and administrative developments. Those
involved in the interception process are aware of the invasive nature of this
technique, and care is taken to ensure that intrusions of privacy are kept to the
minimum. There is another incentive to agencies to ensure that these
documents remain effective in that the value of interception would be greatly
diminished as a covert intelligence tool should its existence and methodology
become too widely known. The sections 15 and 16 requirements are very
important. I am satisfied that the agencies are operating effectively within their
safeguards.
Codes of Practice
57. Section 71(a) of RIPA requires the Secretary of State to issue one or more
Codes of Practice relating to the exercise and performance of duties in relation
to Parts I to III of the Act. The Home Secretary, having first obtained my views
and interim approval of the draft Code of Practice prepared by the Home
Office gave his approval to the draft Code on the basis that he wished to see an
updated Code of Conduct at a later date when RIPA had been in force for a
time. The Home Secretary has consulted me in relation to an updated Code of
Practice which was prepared by the Home Office in consultation with the
relevant agencies and has been approved by the Home Secretary.
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