bly take effect much later in time and provide for broad exceptions. The parties concerned will, in general, not be informed of the further use or transfer of the data allowed by the challenged provisions either. The complainants should therefore not be
made to await the execution of the relevant actions in order to challenge these.
b) The complainants are also affected individually and presently.
The complainants submit that due to their specific political, professional and private
connections to potential persons targeted by the challenged measures there is sufficient probability of them being affected. They submit that by reason of their political
activity, their professional activity as lawyers or psychotherapists, or their commitment to matters of human rights, they may easily come into contact with persons
whom a link with international terrorism may be imputed to. Given the broad scope of
the challenged provisions, which are not tailored to a specific limited group of persons
but rather, pursuant to § 4a BKAG, serve to prevent international terrorism generally
and thus can also broadly affect third parties acting in good faith, it is demonstrated
that there is sufficient probability that their own rights are presently affected (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 <307 and 308>; 113, 348 <363 and 364>; 133, 277 <312 et seq. paras.
86 and 87>).
3. […]
83
84
85
C.
Insofar as the constitutional complaints are directed against the investigative and
surveillance powers, they are well-founded in several respects.
86
I.
In respect of legislative competences, meanwhile, the challenged provisions are
constitutional.
[…]
87
88-89
II.
The challenged surveillance and investigative powers authorise interferences with
fundamental rights, which, depending on which fundamental right is affected and on
the varying weight of the interference, must individually be measured against the principle of proportionality and the principle of legal clarity and specificity. The powers
have in common that the potential interferences they authorise are for the most part
very serious, yet since their objective is to protect against the threat of international
terrorism, they have a legitimate aim and are, to that end, suitable and necessary.
90
1. The challenged powers authorise the Federal Criminal Police Office to covertly
collect personal data in the context of the protection against threats and the prevention of criminal offences. This allows for – depending on the power in question – interferences with the fundamental rights of Art. 13 sec. 1, Art. 10 sec. 1 and Art. 2 sec. 1
91
9/71