in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, the latter both in its manifestation as the right
to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems
as well as the right to informational self-determination.
All these powers provide the legal bases for investigative and surveillance measures which are usually carried out covertly without the knowledge of the parties concerned and can constitute a serious interference with privacy. Even if legitimate expectations of confidentiality are affected to differing degrees and the powers’ weight
of interference varies significantly, these powers generally all have a weight of interference which weighs heavily in any case. Only individual measures pursuant to §
20g secs. 1 and 2 BKAG constitute an exception.
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2. The constitutionality of the powers depends on the limits arising from each of
these fundamental rights and the proportionality requirements which must be determined for each of the powers. According to the principle of proportionality, the granting of these powers must always pursue a legitimate aim and must be suitable, necessary and, in the strict sense, proportionate to achieving this aim (cf. BVerfGE 67, 157
<173>; 70, 278 <286>; 104, 337 <347 et seq.>; 120, 274 <318 and 319>; 125, 260
<316>; established case-law).
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Furthermore, the challenged powers are to be measured against the principle of legal clarity and specificity, which aims to increase the predictability of interferences for
citizens, constitute an effective limit to administrative powers and enable effective judicial review (cf. BVerfGE 113, 348 <375 et seq.>; 120, 378 <407 and 408>; 133, 277
<336 para. 140>; established case-law). With regard to the powers in question here
that pertain to the covert collection and processing of data, and that have the potential
to constitute serious interferences with privacy, the principle sets up particularly strict
requirements. Since affected persons can for the most part neither notice nor challenge the use of these powers, their content – in contrast to, for example, administrative law terms that are open to interpretation and executed by means of an administrative act – can only be rendered more specific to a very limited extent within the
interplay between actual application and judicial review. Individually, however, the requirements differ, depending on the weight of the interference, and are thus tightly
linked to the respective substantive requirements of proportionality (cf. BVerfGE 110,
33 <55>; 113, 348 <376>).
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3. The challenged provisions pursue a legitimate aim and are suitable and necessary to that end.
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a) The powers pursue a legitimate aim. They provide the Federal Criminal Police Office with means of gathering information which it can use in fulfilling its new task of
protecting against threats from international terrorism. The term “international terrorism” as set out in the description of tasks in § 4a sec. 1 BKAG and its reference to
§ 129a secs. 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB) is, in line with
the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 and international terminology (OJ L
164, p. 3; Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, in: Measures
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