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Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Officers (AOs) within public authorities unambiguously to set out what activity is authorised
in order that those conducting the surveillance are clear on what has been sanctioned. We
will look closely at this in 2020, because such ambiguity leads to the risk that unauthorised
surveillance might be conducted inadvertently.
13.4
CHIS powers were used rarely but well by WPAs. Our inspections at most authorities
considered whether proper training and processes were in place to ensure that CHIS were
not run without appropriate authority and that staff understood the key principles. Even
if the powers were not being used, this would ensure that any future CHIS activity would
be compliant.
Covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)
13.5
We inspected each authorisation for the use of CHIS in 2019. Notable findings from these
inspections included one WPA which had good processes in place to deal with potential
legally professional privileged (LPP) material and which had followed the requirement to
implement a higher level of authorisation in this event. At another inspection, we noted
a good level of compliance although only one CHIS case was active. This inspection found
a robust and questioning attitude to the management of CHIS coupled with suitable
processes in place to support it.
13.6
In several WPAs, the power to authorise CHIS has been relinquished, either because there
is no requirement or because of a recognition by the authority that the infrastructure,
training and knowledge required compliantly to manage CHIS did not outweigh the
potential intelligence benefits to be gained.
Figure 11: CHIS authorisations for wider public authorities, 2017 to 2019
14
13
12
11
10
8
6
4
4
2
0
13.7
2017
2018
2019
Status drift is the term we use to describe when the forming and maintaining of a
relationship with a member of the public who is suppling information, without a CHIS
authorisation in place, changes to a relationship where the individual is being tasked to
obtain information covertly on behalf of the authority and a CHIS authorisation would be
required. We look for occurrences of status drift during all of our inspections, especially of
those which have staff in contact with the public and of those that do not have the power
to authorise CHIS. We also look for instances where the organisation may be establishing a
relationship with an individual who is being questioned or tasked in a way that should be