Investigatory Powers Commissioner ’s Annual Report 2019
13. Wider public authorities
Overview
13.1
Several public authorities, in addition to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and local
councils, have the statutory power to use certain covert tactics. We refer to these
authorities as Wider Public Authorities (WPAs) and include a list at Annex A. The nature
and extent of these powers differs across the WPAs dependent on their functions. Several,
although not all, are empowered to authorise the use of directed surveillance and the
acquisition of communications data but the tactics requiring a higher level of authorisation
(property interference and intrusive surveillance) are limited to a smaller number of
WPAs.37 In relation to the authorisation of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), many
WPAs do have the statutory power but most have chosen not to exercise it, citing (amongst
other reasons) a lack of appropriately qualified and trained staff to fulfil the roles of
handler38 and controller, or an ability to achieve their objectives by pursuing less intrusive
means. However, some WPAs have reported that they are reviewing their policies not to
authorise the use and conduct of CHIS in recognition of the changing nature of the criminal
enterprises they are encountering, particularly online.
13.2
WPAs deploy covert tactics in support of a broad range of investigations which reflect the
diverse nature of the investigative and enforcement functions they perform. Principally
these are:
• to investigate and prosecute breaches of company and insolvency legislation;
• investigation of fraudulent benefit claims;
• tackling environmentally damaging pollution; and
• the regulation of medicines, medical devices and equipment used in healthcare.
Findings
13.3
We found that the generally high standards identified in the 2018 report have been
maintained. Those WPAs which exercised their powers on a regular basis attained the
highest standards of compliance and often benefited from deploying experienced staff
in Covert Authorities Bureaus (CABs) to quality assure the application and authorisation
process. A recurring recommendation has been the continuing failure by many Authorising
37 Property interference can only be authorised by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),
Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), Police Investigations and Review Commissioner, or the
Home Office. Intrusive surveillance can only be used by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),
Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), the Home Office (for customs and immigration matters only)
and the Ministry of Justice and Northern Ireland Office (in both the latter cases, for activity in prisons only).
38 A handler has day to day responsibility for dealing with the source on behalf of the public authority and for
the source’s security and welfare. The controller has general oversight of the use made of the source and is
responsible for the management and supervision of the handler.
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