Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
documentation. These should detail the time and date of liaison with the warrant granting
department (WGD) to seek approval from the Secretary of State to effect an intercept. We
have found that these records are well kept.
Figure 6: Proportion of urgent and routine applications for targeted
interception, 2019
3%
Routine
Urgent
97%
12.41
Collateral intrusion can change in the lifetime of a warrant and we identified some room
for improvement in some applications and modifications in the way assessment was being
made in the potential for collateral intrusion. Specifically, this related to the potential for
increased interference with privacy depending on the type of activity being requested. We
addressed this by taking part in a workshop with applicants and supervisors and we had
input from our own legal team. We are aware of improvement since this workshop and will
monitor into next year.
12.42
The renewals that we examined documented a good summary of the intelligence value of
the interception product obtained to date and outlined why continuance was sought. Any
modifications requested after those renewals clearly set out the reasons for any additions
or deletions. Cancellations that we saw were promptly submitted when subjects were
arrested, disrupted, or when continued interception was no longer considered either
necessary or proportionate.
12.43
We have access to the systems used by LEAs to manage targeted interception. We checked
random selected samples of warrants that have been renewed by searching these systems
to ensure they are still necessary and proportionate. We cross referenced this with relevant
modifications. The samples we checked were to a high standard and we are satisfied that in
those samples, warrants are being cancelled if no longer necessary or proportionate.
Sensitive professions
12.44
Our inspection regime focuses on how each intercepting agency handles any confidential
and legally privileged information collected and the arrangements for its storage or
deletion. Before each interception inspection, we review a list of all warrants where the
subject holds a sensitive profession and where sensitive material has been obtained. This
includes all legally privileged material, confidential personal information, confidential
journalistic material or communication with a spiritual counsellor which has been
intercepted and retained.
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