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Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Streamlining documentation
Discussions with law enforcement agencies highlighted that the separate administrative
processes now in place for targeted equipment interference (TEI), alongside under-cover
policing, property interference, and intrusive surveillance authorisations, would benefit from
being streamlined. In each case, the process has been differently designed to address the
same principles of necessity, proportionality and minimising intrusion. We agree with the view
of many police forces that a more consistent administration process would enable both the
Authorising Officers and our Inspectors to conduct oversight with greater effect. We expect
that this will be considered by the Home Office when they review the success and continued
adequacy of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, although we understand that aligning divergent
and established processes could, in reality, be a greater challenge than the benefits that would
likely be realised.
12.37
Our oversight has demonstrated that the standard of TEI authorisations has been
generally good with some minor ‘teething’ problems seen during the first few months of
implementation. These are associated more with the administration of the new IPA process,
rather than issues of legal compliance or the necessity and proportionality of the activity.
It is worth noting that we made no formal recommendations in relation to TEI during this
short period. We raised a number of observational learning points on the use of templated
or generic phraseology seen within some applications, and the need for more bespoke
explanations in line with the requirements set out in Chapter 4 of the TEI CoP.
12.38
During our inspections and discussions with applicants, as noted in chapter 2, we
identified that a general lack of understanding prevailed across LEAs as to what constitutes
a thematic or non-thematic warrant, the use of a general descriptor (where it has not
been possible to name all the individuals covered by the warrant) and the correct
process to follow for modifications. To address this, we have held discussions with law
enforcement representatives nationally to improve understanding of these issues and
assist them to develop revised guidance and training material for applicants and senior
authorising officers.
Targeted Interception (TI)
12.39
The use of modifications to amend existing warrants has been a primary focus of our
interception inspections. Both major and minor modifications are used to add or remove
people and factors to warrants. Minor modifications are authorised within the agency and
can be used to either add/remove a factor or remove a subject. The internal authorisation
process for minor modifications is a new concept and our focus has been on ensuring that
any additional factors added are within the scope of the original warrant application. We
will also check to ensure that as soon as a factor is deemed no longer relevant, immediate
steps are taken to suspend the interception and a minor modification is submitted to
cancel. The minor modifications we examined on our inspections provide full and thorough
records of the required interception, clearly set out how the new subject or device is
relevant to the warrant and address attribution and collateral intrusion associated with
that factor. LEAs have in this year had a small limited use of “thematic” warrants so by far
the majority of minor modifications done relate to factors added and removed from “nonthematic” warrants.
12.40
LEAs need rapidly to respond to threat-to-life situations and interception coverage can
be a useful tactic in protecting the public and saving lives. We examine all urgent oral
warrants and scrutinise any internal logs and notebooks which make up the out-of-hours