230.
That evidence suggests the following:
(1) An email or text sent by A to B, when both are located in London,
could be intercepted by the NSA either because it is one of a mass of
emails or texts intercepted as part of a bulk programme or as part
of some more targeted exercise.
(2) The UK Intelligence Services could then obtain that email or text
(or its associated communications data) because:
i. The NSA gives the UK Intelligence Services access, in bulk,
to raw initially intercepted material and the UK Intelligence
Services themselves extract, filter, store, analyse and/or
disseminate emails/texts that are of interest to them;
ii. The NSA provides the email/text, unsolicited, to the UK
Intelligence Services;
iii. The UK Intelligence Services ask the NSA to initially
intercept or otherwise obtain the email/text and provide it to
the UK Intelligence Services.
231.
The Court should determine whether, if material is accessed or obtained
in any of the ways described above, the safeguards in place are sufficient
to meet the Article 8 in accordance with law requirement.
B.
Minimum safeguards are required where the Government
accesses information intercepted by a foreign intelligence agency
232.
In paragraphs 157-183 above, the Applicants lay out the minimum
safeguards this Court has indicated should apply to communications
interception. The Government’s position is that these safeguards
developed in relation to intercept material have no application where the
initial act of initial interception was conducted by a foreign state but
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