227.
The US, as described by the NSA itself, is “the principal hub in the world’s
telecommunication system”.130 Much of the world’s communications and
communications data transit fibre optic cables landing in or traversing the
US or via servers located within the US. Thus if A (located in London)
sends an email or text to B (also located in London), it may very well pass
through cables, or be stored on servers, which the NSA can, at least in
principle, access.
228.
There are a range of different ways in which the NSA could obtain that
communication between A and B or the data associated with it, and then
provide the UK Intelligence Services with access to it. For instance, the
US could engage in “bulk” initial interception of vast quantities of
communications or communications data as they transit the internet
without limiting what is obtained to specific individuals or specific
communications. It could then provide GCHQ with access to the raw
initially intercepted material. GCHQ could then extract communications
or communications data from that material, filter those that are of
interest and store, analyse and disseminate them.
229.
The Government suggests (see, in particular, Observations, §§ 1.1-1.20)
that the Court should assume that the USA only engages in targeted
interception and does not give access to raw material, initially intercepted
in bulk by the NSA, to the UK Intelligence Services. If that is the
Respondent’s submission, it should be rejected. That is, in the first place,
because of clear and credible evidence (see paras 69-71 above and Factual
Appendix, paras 10-19) that the US intelligence agencies engage in bulk
interception and that the UK has access to this material. The US
Government has itself publicly acknowledged the veracity of certain of this
evidence. Moreover, the Government has never denied the contents or
authenticity of this evidence.
130
Farr Witness Statement,
89