measures only if he is able to show that, due to his personal situation, he is
potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures.” (Zakharov, §171).
260.
The IPT does not “provide…effective remedies”. As discussed above,
significant factual developments alter this Court’s description of the IPT
in Kennedy. In particular, the IPT does not offer “extensive jurisdiction…to
examine any complaint of unlawful interception” (Kennedy, §167).
Moreover, the effectiveness of the IPT as an oversight body is undermined
by its briefing with MI5 in 2007 and its acquiescence not to receive
categories of stored information when a complaint was made. The
Applicants discuss the failures of the IPT in this case in its section
addressing Article 6(1).
261.
Finally, the Applicants note that the Government never disputed before
the IPT that the Applicants were “victims” in relation to the s8(4) and
intelligence sharing claims. The Government should not now be permitted
to change the stance which it took before the domestic courts and must be
regarded as having conceded and accepted that the Applicants are, indeed,
victims.
IV
VIOLATION
OF
ARTICLE
14,
TAKEN
TOGETHER
WITH
ARTICLES 8 AND/OR 10
262.
The s8(4) Regime is indirectly discriminatory on grounds of national origin
because of the additional safeguards granted to those known to be in the
British Islands but denied to those abroad under s16 RIPA. It is not
disputed that the facts in issue fall within the ambit of Articles 8 and 10.
263.
The Government contends that there is no violation of Article 14 for two
reasons. First, the Government asserts that there is no relevant difference
in treatment. Second, it submits that any difference in treatment is
justified. These will be considered in turn.
101