by the US Government (DISHFIRE, XKEYSCORE and MARINA). The
breadth of these programmes indicate that “all users of communications
services”, including the Applicants, could have their communications
intercepted by the US Government and shared with the UK Intelligence
Services.
257.
The Government relies on the “note” relating to the intelligence sharing
arrangements, as evidence supposedly cabining the UK Intelligence
Services’ access to information intercepted by the US Government
(Observations §3.5(2)). But the note itself is of questionable authority, as
is described in paragraph 93 above.
258.
In any event, the text of the note is so broad as to reasonably permit the
sharing of the Applicants’ communications. It speaks of the UK
Intelligence Services making a “request” for “intercepted communications
(and associated communications data)” or circumstances where they
“receive intercepted communications content or communications data.”
While the “request” is purportedly limited to that which could be
authorised by RIPA (except in special circumstances), since RIPA permits
bulk interception under s8(4) this is not a substantive limitation. “Receipt”
is not defined at all. It is possible, therefore, that “request” or “receipt”
could cover all the scenarios posited above in paragraphs 33-34 where the
UK Intelligence Services may access material intercepted by foreign
intelligence agencies, from raw, unanalysed intercept material to fully
analysed reports.
B.
Availability and effectiveness of remedies
259.
The Court has held that “if the national system provides for effective
remedies…the individual may claim to be a victim of a violation occasioned
by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret
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