tion; oversight that is mostly exercised in an honorary capacity is not sufficient. The
composition of the oversight bodies must also be balanced. Both structurally and in
terms of personnel, a sufficient distance to the Federal Intelligence Service must be
ensured to guarantee the independence required of the oversight bodies.
bb) Sufficient personnel and resources must be made available for both types of
oversight. The oversight regime resembling judicial review requires a sufficient number of positions and panels to thoroughly conduct the oversight tasks assigned to it;
the financial resources available for the positions must be sufficient to attract highly
qualified persons. Likewise, the administrative oversight regime requires a sufficient
number of positions for qualified personnel. Financial resources must be sufficient to
permit effective scrutiny of, for example, the filtering mechanisms used to remove
communications in which Germans and persons within Germany are involved or
which concern relationships of trust; to this end, the oversight bodies must be able to
develop their own databases and software where necessary. The positions and resources to be allocated to each oversight body will probably be more or less equivalent to what is currently allocated to the Permanent Representative of the Parliamentary Oversight Body.
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f) The oversight bodies must have all the powers necessary for effective oversight
vis-à-vis the Federal Intelligence Service.
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aa) Both oversight bodies must be granted comprehensive access to all documents.
The legislator must impose an obligation on the Federal Intelligence Service to support the oversight bodies in the performance of their tasks, to provide information to
them and to grant them access to documents and files, information about its software
and access to its premises at all times (cf. BVerfGE 133, 277 <370 and 371
para. 215 et seq.>; 141, 220 <284 and 285 para. 141>; see also BTDrucks 14/5655,
p. 26 with reference to BVerfGE 100, 313 <401>). The oversight bodies can determine their procedures and select their methods themselves insofar as these are not
provided for by law.
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bb) As part of the constitutional requirements with regard to oversight, the Federal
Intelligence Service must document its data processing measures (cf. BVerfGE 133,
277 <370 para. 215>; 141, 220 <284 and 285 para. 141>; established case-law). The
various steps of surveillance must be documented in a way that makes effective oversight possible. Where necessary, the relevant principles must be determined in more
detail by the Federal Intelligence Service in consultation with the oversight bodies.
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cc) Oversight must not be obstructed by the third party rule. In designing the oversight bodies and setting out requirements regarding agreements between the Federal Intelligence Service and other intelligence services, the legislator must ensure that
the Federal Intelligence Service cannot prevent oversight by invoking the third party
rule.
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Nevertheless, the third party rule is a rule of conduct that is based on agreements
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