sight bodies is concerned. The bodies must be effectively shielded from external influence and must be completely independent in this regard.
For the rest, the legislator is afforded wide latitude as regards the institutional structure of the oversight bodies. For example, this concerns the question of whether administrative oversight should be exercised by the Federal Data Protection Commissioner or by an independent oversight body. However, the legislator will have to
organise oversight in such a way that it is not obstructed by the third party rule (see
para. 292 et seq. below). It is not predetermined by the Constitution whether oversight resembling judicial review and administrative oversight should be combined under one roof in a single institution, which would incorporate the panels resembling
courts into a comprehensive oversight body – whilst ensuring their members’ independence, which must be equivalent to judicial independence –, or whether the two
types of oversight should be exercised by two independent bodies. Yet the legislator
is required to establish clear institutional structures.
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e) Overall, the oversight bodies must be equipped with resources that allow for the
effective and independent performance of their tasks.
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aa) The oversight bodies must be equipped with competent and professional personnel and their composition must be balanced. In this respect, too, the legislator has
wide latitude, but it is obliged to ensure that the legislative design guarantees effective oversight that is independent in legal and factual terms.
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(1) The legislator must require the appointment of persons that are experts in the
field, can fully understand the processes within the Federal Intelligence Service and
ensure independent and competent oversight when they work together. At least with
regard to administrative oversight, it may be necessary to not only consider legal experts, but also persons with other knowledge particularly in the field of information
technology.
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(2) With regard to oversight resembling judicial review, it must be ensured that the
appointed members are independent in a way that is equivalent to judicial independence. In particular, they must not be bound by instructions and must be appointed
for a sufficiently long and fixed term. As regards the composition of the panel, the
judicial perspective must be accorded significant weight, which must be ensured
through the appointment of a large proportion of members with longstanding judicial
experience. This does not mean that other legal professionals cannot be appointed,
too. It must be taken into consideration that other expertise, in particular technical
expertise, may also be helpful to the panel. It is for the legislator to decide whether
the members of the oversight body resembling a court should also include nonlawyers – possibly depending on the type of decision to be made –, or whether it
wants to provide the body with other possibilities for drawing on technical expertise.
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(3) Overall, it must be ensured that oversight is competent and professional by generally appointing persons to the oversight body for whom this is their primary occupa-
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