2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
conferred by the creation of an IG, with an office and supporting staff, which we do not already
enjoy, or cannot obtain by some relatively minor adjustments to our present arrangements. The
only benefit which comes to mind is that an IG could choose to review the operational decisions
of the services. But such a review can only really be justified if something seems to have gone
badly wrong, and our existing arrangements allow for that. Otherwise operational decisions must
be in the unfettered control of the Director of the relevant service, who is answerable to the
Minister, and I do not see what is to be gained by subjecting the Director to the oversight of an
IG.
The Green Paper then deals with the need to ensure that there is a balanced system, pointing
out that, for instance, some powers which might be given to the ISC could not be given if there
was an IG.
Two subsequent questions are then posed:
Q3: What combination of existing or reformed arrangements can best ensure credible, effective
and flexible independent oversight of the activities of the intelligence community in order to
meet the security challenges of today and the future?
So far as lawful interception is concerned I am content with the combination of arrangements
which at present exists. I have complete access to warrantry materials, and to records in relation
to data which has been obtained, and my inspectors and I are completely independent. So we
have the full powers and professional integrity of any auditor, but we are not the only safeguard
against abuse. An important additional safeguard is that every application for a warrant or for
data is scrutinised at a number of levels before it is approved, so the possibility of successful
deliberate abuse is very small indeed, if statutory channels are being used. But it is also important
to emphasize the roles of the Secretary of State and the ISC. Without impinging on my role they
have separate roles and provide political accountability, which is particularly important in an area
that cannot be opened to public scrutiny.
Q4.With the aim of achieving the right balance in the intelligence oversight system overall, should
greater emphasis be placed on reforming parliamentary oversight or independent oversight?
For the reasons I have given I see no reason to press for any reform to the role of the Interception
Commissioner in providing oversight in his particular territory, the boundaries of which are
clearly defined. It is also obvious that the commissioner cannot be accountable to the Secretary
of State, whose actions he reviews, or to the ISC. I do not, however, consider it appropriate for
a serving commissioner to offer any comments in relation to reform of parliamentary oversight.
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