2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
12 ANNEX A
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATION
COMMISSIONER’S RESPONSE TO THE
JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER
1. Introduction
Chapter 1 sets the scene and makes the case for change. Chapter 2 makes proposals for
dealing with sensitive material in civil proceedings. The proposals involve the conduct of civil
proceedings and touch upon the role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. As to the conduct of
civil proceedings it seems to me that the responses would be most helpful if they come from
serving Judges (possibly via the Office of the LCJ), and so far as the IPT is concerned I understand
that it will respond in relation to Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 begins by dealing with Ministerial responsibility and Parliamentary oversight (the
Intelligence and Security Committee: ISC). This is not an area that calls for comments from a
serving commissioner, so I concentrate on the paragraphs beginning with 3.39. They begin with
a proposal to expand the statutory role of the Intelligence Services Commissioner (para 3.43)
and I leave that to him.
The Paper then outlines the possible role of an Inspector-General before posing two questions.
Q1: What changes to the commissioners’ existing remit can best enhance the valuable role they
play in intelligence oversight and ensure their role will continue to be effective for the future?
How can their role be made more public facing? Are more far-reaching proposals preferable, for
instance through the creation of an Inspector-General?
The auditing role of the Interceptions Commissioner is clearly set out in the statute. It has clear
boundaries, and seems to work well in practice. I see no compelling reason to change the nature
of the role or the boundaries. I accept that the work could be undertaken as part of the role of
an Inspector-General, but that might not be so patently independent, nor would it be any cheaper.
Furthermore the role would not be, nor could it be, any more public facing than it is already
because of the nature of the material being examined.The procedures used by the commissioner
and his inspectors are clearly set out in the Annual Reports, and from time to time in lectures.
Information is provided so far as it can be provided but, for good and compelling reasons, the
whole picture cannot be disclosed.
Q2: Are more far-reaching intelligence oversight reform proposals preferable, for instance
through the creation of an Inspector-General?
The IG model clearly works well in other jurisdictions, but it does have its drawbacks- it creates
a fresh quango. The incumbent can easily be accused of being too close to Government, or too
keen to find fault with the security services. Our arrangements are, to some extent, an accident
of history, but they do achieve a neat balance between political accountability and independent
judicial scrutiny. In response to the question it is appropriate to ask what benefits would be
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