the investigative preparation of a profile with a full set of basic data, but merely brings
about a pooling of the data already held by the individual agencies. […]
b) There are also no constitutional objections in terms of the prohibition of disproportionate measures with regard to the scope of the extended basic data to be stored under § 3 sec. 1 no. 1b ATDG; these are normally provided to the participating agencies
only indirectly after a search resulted in a match, and are released directly only in
emergencies. However, the legislature must ensure that the specifications governing
application are comprehensibly documented and published for those criteria whose
content will be defined only by a further abstract and general specification by the administration.
170
aa) The storage of the criteria under § 3 sec. 1 no. 1b aa to ff, jj, ll, mm, oo, pp and
qq ATDG is constitutionally unobjectionable.
171
(1) The criteria to be entered in the counter-terrorism database under these provisions are defined with sufficient specificity by the legislature, and do not rely on the intermediate step of an abstract and general specification by the executive. The scope
of the obligation to store data is directly evident from them, and their application can
readily be reviewed in audits by supervisory entities and, if applicable, examinations
by the courts. […]
172
(2) The criteria to be recorded according to these provisions are also in terms of
their scope and significant content compatible with the prohibition of disproportionate
measures.
173
However, the potential significance of these data is extensive. […]
174
On the other hand, here too it must be taken into account that the provisions do not
provide for the collection of new data, but only for a pooling of the data already held
by the individual agencies. Most importantly, however, this severity of interference is
countered by the highly important public interest in the effective investigation and
combating of international terrorism (see above, D. III. 3. b) […].
175
This applies first of all to the aim of being able to provide these data directly and in
full in emergencies for an initial assessment of a threat, so as to guide further action.
[…]
176
But it also applies to the further purpose pursued in storing these data: their indirect,
qualified use for initiating the receipt of information. Precisely because the investigative possibilities opened up by the content of these data are far-reaching, they can
make investigations to avert terrorism significantly more expedient, and there is an
important public interest in having the data made available. Because the data remain
limited to a group of persons affiliated with terrorism, and to data that have already
been gathered, there is, in principle, no objection to their being made available. The
crucial factor for extended basic data here is that they are provided only indirectly
subject to a specific request process to the authorities to initiate the receipt of infor-
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