contact persons who know of the relevant principal’s connection with terrorism, the
extended basic data (§ 3 sec. 1 no. 1b ATDG) are also to be entered in the database.
The provision that includes contact persons as a separate group in a data transfer
that also incorporates unmasked information does not meet the requirements for
specificity. On this basis one cannot predict which persons are in fact to be included
in the database. Even if the legislature makes an exception for persons who have only a fleeting or chance contact, the provision includes everyone throughout the social
living environment of the persons named under numbers 1 and 2 of the provision –
both those in the private environment and those who have professional or business
contacts with them. But evidently not all persons who thus come under consideration
are actually supposed to be included in the database. […] Rather, the determination
of what data are to be stored is ultimately left up to [the authorities’] free discretion.

164

In view of the size of the group of persons covered by the provision, which is scarcely comprehensible, the provision also violates the prohibition of disproportionate measures. However, it is not generally prohibited by constitutional law to make data of
contact persons available in the counter-terrorism database. As a rule, such persons
who are not covered by numbers 1 and 2 of the provision, and who therefore do not
themselves count as potential supporters of terrorist activities, are, according to the
database’s purpose, only of interest to the degree they can provide information about
the principal who is thought to have a close connection to terrorism. The design of the
legislation must take its guidance from this fact. […] This applies irrespective of
whether such contact persons do or do not know about the principal’s connection with
terrorism.

165

3. There is no constitutional objection to the scope of data collected, as provided under § 3 sec. 1 nos. 1a and 1b ATDG. However, with regard to § 3 sec. 1 no. 1b ATDG,
which already includes some requirements for further specification by the administration, supplementary provisions are needed.

166

a) The specification of the basic data described under § 3 sec. 1 no. 1a ATDG and
made available to the participating authorities as unmasked information without qualified thresholds for interference is not constitutionally objectionable.

167

However, the scope and significance of these data are considerable. […]
Nevertheless, the provision is compatible with the prohibition of disproportionate
measures. The description of the data is sufficiently specific, and its reach is proportionate, even in an overall assessment. Limited to persons who may be potentially affiliated with terrorism (see D. IV. 2. above), the data are used in preparing a meaningful basic profile for the more precise identification of the persons concerned. That
profile, however, is ultimately still limited to external parameters. In view of the importance of combating terrorism, this is constitutionally unobjectionable even if one includes the data from the intelligence services. Here it must again be borne in mind
that these data are not gathered anew, and therefore the database does not aim for

34/45

168
169

Select target paragraph3