IPCO Annual Report 2018
of a sustained personal relationship. Whilst this is usually the case, we identified some
important exceptions during our inspections in 2018.
10.12
In some cases, the assurances relied upon are dependent on a specific individual and their
ability to ensure their organisation complies with the assurances. Should the political
context change, or should key personnel leave post, assurances could become unreliable.
SIS keeps this risk under very careful and continuous review and updates the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the event that the circumstances materially changed. We
have recommended that SIS ensure they make clear in submissions to Ministers any cases
where they judge assurances to be particularly fragile.
10.13
In other cases, a material change to SIS’s understanding of a liaison partner’s behaviour
necessitates a review of the assurances which are in place. We are satisfied that UKIC’s
working practices are sufficiently agile to adapt their assessment as new information or
intelligence comes to light.
Caveats
10.14
When UKIC or the MOD pass intelligence to a liaison partner in writing, it is common
practice to attach a caveat setting out how this intelligence is to be used. Typically, the
caveat would instruct that no action (such as arrests and detention) should take place
on the basis of the intelligence without first consulting the UK. This is an internationally
accepted practice which HMG can expect to be respected. As such, caveats can be an
important mitigation of compliance risk associated with sharing intelligence.
10.15
Having reviewed the caveats in use across UKIC, we concluded that they are being used
inconsistently and risk being counter-productive in some cases. For example:
• GCHQ used some caveats which were not appropriate or not relevant to the liaison
partner in question;
• SIS routinely attached caveats to formal notes passed to liaison partners but these are
not always worded in clear English or comprehensible to a non-native speaker, they are
translated into the local language in some but not all cases;
• MI5 has a range of different caveats in use and sometimes applies the incorrect caveat to
material passed to liaison partners.
10.16
We have recommended that UKIC ensures that any caveats attached to intelligence
and passed to liaison are correct and are simple and comprehensible to the recipient,
translating these into the local language wherever possible.
Allegations of Mistreatment
10.17
On a small number of occasions, UKIC and the MOD were made aware of allegations
of mistreatment by a liaison partner in circumstances which engage paragraph 6 of the
Consolidated Guidance. In every case, we were satisfied that these allegations were
effectively and comprehensively investigated. There were no cases where the investigation
concluded that HMG had made a material contribution to any mistreatment which had
occurred. In some cases, cooperation with the liaison service was paused whilst an
investigation took place; the thorough, impartial nature of the investigation which was
conducted in these cases formed a strong evidence base on which to take the decision to
resume cooperation with the liaison service in question.
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