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differently and we have suggested that more could be done to join up the process where
a decision engages more than one organisation. A considerable amount of work has now
been done to achieve this.
10.6
In 2017, we noted that the MOD were not recording the matters taken into consideration in
relation to the risk of a lack of due process on their Consolidated Guidance documentation.
Our recent inspection confirmed that the internal guidance has been updated to prompt
the assessing officer to set down any relevant points. We are satisfied that the MOD’s
approach meets the requirements of the Consolidated Guidance.
Assessing Risk
10.7
Frequently, UKIC and the MOD must decide whether to pass intelligence to a foreign liaison
partner, or to cooperate with them in a joint operation. In any circumstances where Her
Majesty’s Government (HMG) is not able directly to control the circumstances of detention,
the officers involved must assess the risk that suspects or detainees could be mistreated.
This assessment will rely on a range of factors, including HMG’s knowledge of the liaison
partner’s human rights record and their conduct in similar operations, and the specifics
of the particular case. The Consolidated Guidance provides a framework for officers to
escalate any case where there is assessed to be a risk of mistreatment.
10.8
We welcomed UKIC’s decision to set up a central team to draft objective summaries of
liaison partners’ compliance status to inform decisions under the Consolidated Guidance.
We were impressed by the quality of the assessments it has produced to date. However,
a number of more challenging priority countries have not yet been assessed. We have
made several recommendations to UKIC which focus on ensuring all relevant staff have
access to these assessments and take these into account when making decisions under the
Consolidated Guidance.
10.9
In cases where the risks are assessed to be serious, UKIC and the MOD submit to Ministers
for a decision. In this scenario it is vital that assessments about the risks and national
security benefits of proceeding are presented in an objective and balanced manner. This
was overwhelmingly the case in submissions we reviewed, although we noted one case at
SIS where uncertainties about the reliability of the underlying intelligence case were not
articulated as clearly as they should have been.
10.10
In a small number of cases at SIS and the MOD, we observed officers recording the level of
risk as ‘unknown’ or referring to a ‘generic risk of mistreatment’. We have recommended
to SIS and the MOD that risks must be quantified as either above or below the ‘serious risk’
threshold; uncertainty is a key factor in the decision before Ministers, but officers should
not fall back on ‘unknown risk’.
Assurances
10.11
Assurances are an important mitigation which can be relied upon by HMG to prevent
mistreatment occurring at the hands of a liaison service. Assurances are typically sought
from a senior figure who can guarantee that an individual will be detained in a specific
and compliant facility and that local officers will not engage in unacceptable behaviour.
The logic in most of the records we reviewed was that, amongst other things, by engaging
with a senior and credible figure in the organisation in question, HMG can rely on the
assurances obtained and can continue to rely on those assurances because of the strength