52
IPCO Annual Report 2018
Bulk Interception (BI) and Equipment Interference (EI)
8.19
In 2018, GCHQ transitioned its lawful authority for conducting bulk interception and bulk
equipment interference from RIPA warrants to warrants under Part 6 of the IPA. GCHQ’s use
of bulk powers is a vital and sensitive area of operations, which we have scrutinised closely
as the IPA has come into force. GCHQ gave a number of briefings to JCs and members of the
Technology Advisory Panel (TAP), including demonstrations on a range of technical topics.
These were augmented by demonstrations of how data is held and safeguarded within
GCHQ and how it is accessed by operators.
8.20
A higher proportion of GCHQ’s EI operations than previously envisaged are conducted in
reliance on bulk equipment interference (BEI) warrants. We have questioned this approach
and underlined the importance of making internal records open to inspection. GCHQ sets
out clear arguments in all of their warrant applications for the necessity and proportionality
of using bulk techniques in pursuit of their statutory functions. We are satisfied with this
argument, but continue to challenge this assertion on a case-by-case basis to ensure that
this is the correct approach in each instance. Overall, we were content with the way in
which GCHQ is managing its use of EI powers and were satisfied that the necessity and
proportionality of individual operations is being well accounted for in internal records
of reliance on the key bulk warrants. These are subject to an enhanced level of post
facto inspection. Nevertheless, given the scale of GCHQ activity which is being internally
approved under bulk warrants, we will continue subjecting EI operations to particularly
detailed scrutiny on inspections.
8.21
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgment in the Big Brother Watch case
concluded that there should be more robust independent oversight of the selectors that
are used by analysts to examine material that has been collected under a bulk interception
warrant. This conclusion is also relevant to bulk equipment interference. In 2018, we
scrutinised analysts’ justifications as to the necessity and proportionality of material
they selected for examination from bulk systems. In 2019, we plan to explore enhancing
further our oversight of the process for selecting material from bulk intercept by examining
the technical processes by which GCHQ filters material collected in bulk before it is
made available for examination. Given the volumes of data involved, it is critical to the
proportionality of GCHQ’s operations that this process is managed effectively.
8.22
Whenever GCHQ analysts conduct a query of bulk data, they are required to draft
a statement explaining why their query is necessary and proportionate. Overall, we
concluded that these justifications were meeting the required standard and analysts were
accounting for the proportionality of their queries of bulk data in sufficient detail. GCHQ
has responded to recommendations made by IPCO in this area and has a plan in place to
improve standards across the board. We had begun to observe improvements towards
the end of 2018. This work is particularly important, because GCHQ’s ability to use powers
in bulk relies on having a robust and accountable internal approval and documentation
structure in place.
Operational Purposes
8.23
The IPA established defined operational purposes for bulk interception and bulk equipment
interference. These are recorded in a list approved annually by the Prime Minister.
8.24
An agency can only select for examination product from bulk interception (content or
secondary data) or from bulk equipment interference for a purpose listed on the warrant
under which the product was obtained.