IPCO Annual Report 2018
Surveillance
8.12
This last point also applies to Directed Surveillance Authorisations (DSAs). This again is a
marginal element of GCHQ’s work but we have made recommendations to improve the
rigour of internal oversight.
8.13
Our inspection also identified that GCHQ’s review paperwork for surveillance activity lacked
sufficient detail to enable independent judgement. We have made recommendations to
standardise the content of review documentation to ensure that authorising officers are
meeting the requirements of the Code of Practice (CoP).
Targeted Equipment Interference and Property Interference
8.14
The majority of GCHQ’s technical operations in the UK are now authorised under the
IPA. Any operation that is conducted without the intention to obtain communications,
equipment data or other information will continue to be authorised under section 5 of the
Intelligence Services Act (ISA). We have inspected warrants covering UK-based programmes
of work which relate to operations conducted by and/or in collaboration with industry
partners. We are content that the scope of these operations and the role of the partner are
clearly articulated on the authorisation casework.
8.15
We noted a lack of clarity on the details of planned operations on GCHQ’s applications for
warrants under section 5. In particular, we noted that the extent of any likely collateral
intrusion was not well documented and, in some cases, details of highly technical
operations were not given in full (such as the precise nature of the equipment to be
targeted). Having said this, it is worth noting that GCHQ’s warrantry and legal policy
teams worked closely with UKIC partners and IPCO to agree standards of drafting ahead
of IPA implementation. In particular, GCHQ has recognised the need to articulate complex
technical operations which will be authorised via the double lock. We therefore expect that
the clarity of authorisations will improve significantly in 2019.
Additional targeted interception and targeted examination provisions s17(2)
8.16
As detailed in chapter 2, the IPA sets out provisions to obtain warrants to interception
communications for a group of persons or more than one organisation or set of premises.
Our inspection at GCHQ fell while they were in the transition phase, and we intend to
look closely at the use of thematic warrants in 2019, noting GCHQ’s statement that the
nature of GCHQ’s work lends itself more to bulk collection rather than reliance on thematic
authorisations.
8.17
GCHQ did not make any applications under the provision s17(2)(c) in relation to training
and testing in 2018.
Targeted equipment interference warrants s 101(1) and (2)
8.18
As explained in chapter 6, GCHQ transitioned extant authorisations into the IPA regime
during the latter half of 2018 and we conducted light touch inspections to accommodate
this. We intend to inspect internal mechanisms as well as IPA warrantry closely in 2019. Our
oversight via the double lock did not raise any concerns relating to GCHQ’s operations in
this area and the JCs did not reject any thematic applications.
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