38
IPCO Annual Report 2018
6.21
MI5 did not apply for any warrantry under section 17(2)(c) in relation to training or testing
activities in 2018. We have discussed the use of these provisions with MI5 and expect
that this provision will be relied upon more extensively in 2019. At present, MI5 conducts
some activities under RIPA’s directed surveillance provisions which may be appropriately
authorised under the IPA. We will continue to engage with MI5’s operational and legal
experts in this area. It is worth noting that surveillance Inspectors from IPCO have
examined the relevant authorisations and are satisfied that the relevant activities are being
properly conducted, with consideration to any intrusion that may result.
Targeted equipment interference warrants section 101(1) and (2)
6.22
There was a gradual transition of extant warrants throughout the second half of the year
after the EI element of the IPA came into force in June. Our inspections are retrospective
and we need to set a cut-off date some time before the inspections. We therefore looked
at relatively few IPA warrants in 2018. We conducted ‘light touch’ inspections during this
period to accommodate for the transition.
6.23
Thematic warrants, as authorised under sections 101(1) (b)-(g) and (2) (b)-(e), can be
broad in scope; they can cover a large group of people, a wide geographical area and
lead to the acquisition of a large volume of data. Paragraph 5.13 of the CoP notes that a
thematic warrant may be appropriate where the relevant statutory tests are met and where
a series of individual warrants is not practicable, or where the proposed activity is more
suitably dealt with by a thematic subject-matter in light of, for example, the operational
circumstances.
6.24
The IPA also allows for the use of general descriptors on such warrants. Para 5.16 of the
CoP notes:
“that it may not always be reasonably practicable to include the names or descriptions
of each and every one of the persons, organisations or locations. Accordingly, thematic
warrants fall into two types, those where it is reasonably practicable to include additional
details and those where it is not.”
6.25
Paragraph 5.18 goes on to explain that:
“the practicability of providing individual names or descriptions will need to be assessed
on a case by case basis by the equipment interference authority making the application
and will depend upon, for example, the existing intelligence picture, the scale and pace of
the operation, the nature of the equipment to be interfered with and the time constraints
of the particular operation.”
6.26
During this period the Judicial Commissioners (JCs) have approved thematic warrants
covering a number of circumstances, including those with general descriptors. One
application was rejected by a JC in November 2018. The JC judged that the group of
individuals described did not fall within the definition of 17(2)(a) and that the requested
activity should be appropriately handled in reliance on 17(2)(b) using major modifications
to approve the interception in relation to targets who were not fully identified at the
point of application. A JC subsequently approved an application for this operation which
included a more prescriptive description of the intended targets. At future inspections we
will be giving particular attention to thematic warrants, especially where the authority
is able to change the scope of intrusion without seeking external approval (Targeted
Interception). We will also be testing whether the circumstances described when applying
to use a general descriptor were valid.