IPCO Annual Report 2018
6.13
In 2017, we also reported concern at the high number of errors at MI5 in relation to a
specific category of directed surveillance actions. MI5’s initial response did not reflect
the need to ensure that end-to-end intelligence handling processes were appropriate. In
response to these criticisms, MI5 looked at each stage of their intelligence-handling system
for this technique and established a series of safeguards, both manual and automated, to
prevent further breaches in this area.
6.14
Applications for directed surveillance and property warrants often made reference to the
collection of biometric data. We asked MI5 to provide details on how this sensitive data is
collected, retained and used. We sought to understand how this material was safeguarded
and what value it gave to MI5’s investigators, in particular working with police counterparts.
We received a detailed briefing from MI5 about their collection and retention of biometric
data. We discussed the retention of this material in detail and were satisfied that MI5’s
processes were appropriate and the retention of relevant data was proportionate. We were
content that MI5 have a detailed policy in place to govern this activity.
6.15
We examined MI5’s use of intrusive surveillance (surveillance which takes place in a private
residence or private vehicle when there is a higher expectation of privacy). Intrusive
surveillance is authorised via a warrant signed by a Secretary of State and is typically
authorised in combination with a property warrant to authorise interference with property,
for instance the concealment of a listening device in a home or private vehicle. We were
satisfied with MI5’s use of these powers and made no recommendations.
Targeted Interception (TI) and Equipment Interference (EI)
6.16
Overall, we were satisfied that MI5 had achieved a high level of compliance with the
requirements of both RIPA and the IPA throughout the year in relation to targeted
interception (TI) and had successfully transitioned its internal arrangements to the new
IPA regime.
6.17
For equipment interference (EI), we inspected MI5’s compliance with Section 5 of
the ISA, to the extent that it applied in early 2018, and the new IPA regime following
commencement of Part 5 of the Act. We concluded that MI5 has been fully compliant,
including with the requirements of the new EI regime with respect to the authorisation of
EI operations and the acquisition of data.
6.18
Following transition to the IPA, MI5 is making extensive use of combined warrants under
schedule 8 of the Act. MI5 can apply for combined interception and equipment interference
warrants under the IPA and we will therefore be inspecting MI5’s use of targeted powers
under the IPA in a single, combined inspection in 2019.
6.19
We were satisfied that MI5 is applying the IPA’s safeguards for confidential material,
including legally privileged material, carefully and accurately. However, we have
recommended to MI5 that, when a warrant is renewed or cancelled, MI5 should summarise
clearly whether confidential material was obtained during the period under review.
6.20
In the initial months after the introduction of the IPA, IPCO Inspectors have focussed
on thematic warrants. Our inspections have found that the internal processes around
managing modifications are robust and fit for purpose. Both major and minor modifications
are being written to a good standard and our inspections have seen evidence of good
processes to manage how communications factors are added and removed from the
authorisation. However, this section of the Act was implemented in late 2018 and we will,
therefore, provide a more extensive overview in our 2019 report.
37