IPCO Annual Report 2018
are recruited, and the way in which tasking and well-being considerations are managed.
We scrutinise contact notes and the assessments of the necessity and proportionality of
the use of CHIS, to ensure that authorities are properly using CHIS in accordance with the
specified intelligence requirements. We focus on (i) how expeditiously the CHIS is formally
authorised after the initial approach, to avoid ‘status drift’ (for instance, there is a need
to guard against an unauthorised source giving intelligence to a LEA for a sustained period
during their recruitment); (ii) whether contacts with the CHIS are fully documented; (iii)
whether authorisations are properly considered and explained by the authorising officer
(AO); (iv) if there is a regime for the proper handling and management of the CHIS; (v)
whether risk assessments are dynamically maintained and updated; and (vi) if there is
suitable security surrounding the management of the intelligence provided by the CHIS
product and the individual’s real identity.
5.20
We interview staff who manage CHIS (frequently within Dedicated Source Handling Units
or similarly named teams). We also interview other frontline staff to discuss their dealings
with members of the public to ensure that, inadvertently or otherwise, the latter are not
acting in a capacity that requires a CHIS authorisation.
5.21
As explained in chapter 2, IPCO looks at all cases when juvenile CHIS are used, given their
clear potential vulnerability. We inspect how law enforcement bodies use undercover
officers, particularly as to how undercover officers are managed and the way in which their
safety and welfare is overseen. Generally, we focus on the authority’s duty of care to these
individuals. A third area of interest is when CHIS participate in criminality, with the approval
of an AO. This tactic is used very infrequently and, invariably, when a CHIS is involved in an
offence that is already underway.
5.22
We also conduct inspections in advance of a renewal of authorisations of relevant sources
(undercover police operatives), as set out in the enhanced oversight regime established by
Statutory Instrument 2013/2788.22 In relation to surveillance, IPCO also receives briefings
on new equipment and techniques and we review how officers and staff are trained. A
range of individuals are interviewed, including operational staff and authorising officers. We
challenge the rationale for operations undertaken, to ensure that the most proportionate
techniques were used and, presently, we focus on the handling of intelligence, to ensure
that all relevant material is appropriately safeguarded and destroyed when retention is no
longer justified. Decisions in this context are complicated by the disclosure requirements of
criminal proceedings, whereby law enforcement bodies may be required to retain copies of
intelligence for longer than otherwise would be operationally necessary. We test whether
staff properly understand the requirements of the law in this context and the records that
track the use of the technical equipment used to carry out covert activity are carefully
reviewed. It is worth noting that we particularly scrutinise authorisation records which have
been approved via the double lock when a JC has given specific instructions or imposed
restrictions.
Intercepting Agencies
5.23
We also inspect the nine intercepting agencies on an annual basis.23 Inspections are
conducted by two or three Inspectors, accompanied in some cases by a JC. This includes
scrutiny of the Warrant-Granting Departments in the Home Office and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO).
22 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/2788/pdfs/uksi_20132788_en.pdf
23 Intercepting Agencies: Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC),
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), Ministry of Defence (MOD), MI5, National Crime Agency (NCA), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
Police Scotland, Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
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