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IPCO Annual Report 2018
against specific criteria to enable the agencies to extract intelligence relevant to clearly
identified operational purposes. The IPA introduces new requirements for recording
justifications for accessing material, which have also become a focus of our inspections. The
safeguards referred to above include the physical infrastructure and technology that houses
bulk material and we will ensure that access to this data is strictly limited to those with a
legitimate operational role, who are appropriately vetted and trained. IPCO considers these
restrictions, along with intensive oversight of them, to be fundamental to preventing abuse
of these significant powers.
5.15
In 2018, UKIC inspections were overseen by Sir John Goldring and Lord Bonomy. In addition,
the IPC and Sir John were briefed on a variety of key issues during the course of the year;
they were supported in this work by a Chief Inspector and his team of eight Inspectors,
three of whom are solely involved with UKIC inspections. During the first half of 2018, a
team of two or three Inspectors and a JC, in most instances, conducted the inspections
of each of the relevant covert powers at each agency and where possible, they aimed to
undertake a second inspection of those powers in the second half of the year.
5.16
Before an inspection, the agency is asked to provide a list of all the relevant authorisations
and casework, including internal approval documents. By way of example they will be
required to provide details of the instances when the Consolidated Guidance was applied.
The agency provides sufficient initial detail to enable the inspection team to select material
for further scrutiny. For example, again with the Consolidated Guidance, the agency will
routinely identify whether a submission or application had been sent to the Secretary of
State, along with any liaison partner which was involved.21 In the case of the Intelligence
Services Act (ISA) section 5 authorisations (property warrants), the selection document
might include details of the type of property or type of interference. This allows us to,
broadly, select a cross-section of authorisations or to focus on a specific area of interest,
such as vehicle tracking.
5.17
Using a larger team of Inspectors to oversee UKIC has given IPCO the flexibility to deploy
experts on the use of particular covert powers. For example, surveillance Inspectors have
joined the team to scrutinise UKIC’s use of directed surveillance powers. This has provided
greater confidence that UKIC, law enforcement and the public authorities are being
tested to the same standard. We are confident that all the authorities overseen by IPCO
will start to benefit from this more flexible and coherent approach to oversight over the
coming years.
Law Enforcement Agencies
5.18
Two Chief Inspectors head up an inspectorate of seven communications data (CD)
experts and eight RIPA and Police Act experts, who are responsible for conducting all law
enforcement, public and local authority inspections.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) and Surveillance
5.19
Our annual covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) and surveillance inspections generally
last between three and five days, depending on the size of the agency being inspected. We
use on-site inspections to examine the internal records for any relevant activity conducted
under RIPA. For instance, the use of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) enables LEAs
to frustrate offenders and prevent or detect crime; oversight includes considering how CHIS
21 The term ‘liaison partner’ refers to any overseas government body with whom UK bodies collaborate or share intelligence, such as
local or national police, foreign government departments and foreign intelligence agencies.