IPCO Annual Report 2017
complex and sensitive operations and we are liaising with the FCO to improve oversight by,
and on behalf of, the Secretary of State. This will be a focus of the inspections in 2018, when
we intend to scrutinise the mechanics of ministerial oversight, and the adequacy of the
information that is provided for this purpose.
Assisting parties
11.12
When GCHQ and SIS apply for a s.7 authorisation, they may intend that they are to be
assisted by third parties whom they trust. Increased collaboration between UK intelligence
agencies, in particular with counter terrorism, means that UK military personnel or MI5
officers are increasingly acting in support of other UK agencies, for example where they
have a technical specialism. We have identified a number of cases where these partner
agencies are named as assisting parties in the authorisation but the detail of their activity
has not been articulated in the submission. The Secretary of State should be aware not
only of the activity he is authorising but also who will carry it out. Submissions must
identify which organisations or individuals it is proposed should assist the applicant agency,
how they will provide that assistance and why this step is necessary.
Legally privileged material
11.13
GCHQ relies on class authorisations for a significant proportion of its covert activity. GCHQ
suggested that the scope of these authorisations, which cover a varied set of activities
against different targets internationally, makes it difficult to capture the likelihood of
obtaining LPP material. We are not presently satisfied that this approach provides sufficient
safeguards for LPP and we have recommended that operations which are assessed as being
likely to result in a significant proportion of LPP material should not be conducted under
these broad authorisations. We asked GCHQ to draft a separate application in relation
to a particular operation where this risk was evident. This was reviewed at the following
inspection. We will keep this practice under review, as we consider it is necessary to set out
the likelihood of obtaining LPP material in the application and renewal documents.
Supplementary documentation and internal approvals
11.14
In general, we are satisfied with the approvals processes utililsed by the intelligence agencies.
There are different types of authorisations, such as class authorisations and framework
authorisations. What is planned and the likely intrusion is set out in detail, albeit it is critical
that there is a clear link between the proposed actions and the individual authorisations.
11.15
We inspected the relevant internal paperwork at each agency. Althought the twin issues of
necessity and proportionality are addressed satisfactorily, on occasion the risk of intrusion
is not adequately explained. Furthermore, inappropriate language is sometimes used, and
there were examples of internal documents being described incorrectly as ‘authorising’ an
action which is being carried out under s.7. In a similar vein, in some cases the internal record
sets out additional details and safeguards, and provides more information on the target of the
operation. IPCO’s advice has been clear, namely that these records can only clarify activity
authorised under s.7 and they cannot amend the terms of the authorisation or include
additional actions. There must be no confusion in this regard.
11.16
We inspected some authorisations where the intelligence agencies had annexed information
as part of the submission. On occasion, the intelligence agencies have later updated the
annex to reflect operational requirements and target refinement. However, ISA does not
provide for modifications to s.7. It follows that the status of these supplementary documents
must be made clear.
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