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IPCO Annual Report 2017
11.6
In recent years, the Intelligence Services Commissioner has worked to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the activities carried out under s.7. Building on this valuable work, we have
focused our inspections on the authorisation and review processes, and particularly whether
the Foreign Secretary was provided with a proper understanding of the activity that would be
sanctioned by the authorisation.
11.7
We interview a wide range of relevant members of staff, including (i) internal authorising
officers, (ii) the staff at stations who use or implement the authorisations and (iii) in-house
staff at GCHQ. We look at the authorisations and approvals, and any related paperwork.
We also speak to the lawyers. The authorisations at the FCO are similarly reviewed (in 2017
we looked at these during the second half of the year).
Findings
11.8
The internal and external review processes have been the subject of impressive continued
improvement. However, GCHQ and SIS should establish a clearer and more complete record
of all the actions conducted under s.7 authorisations. A particular concern is that the internal
approvals do not always document adequately the potential intrusion into privacy.
11.9
The intelligence agencies seek to authorise their dealings with foreign intelligence services
under s.7. We are content that work conducted under these authorisations is managed
satisfactorily to ensure compliance with UK and international law. This area is carefully
scrutinised, and the assurances provided to the intelligence agencies are supported by the
close working relationships of the staff at a high and working level. We were impressed by
the level of care and dedication SIS showed to supporting and mentoring foreign services.
This is a significant area of work, which improves compliance and respect for human rights in
a number of countries, and in a way which extends beyond areas of cooperation with the UK.
11.10
Ministerial oversight of the use by the intelligence agencies of covert powers is an important
part of the FCO’s role. We reviewed the processes they utilise to inform the Foreign
Secretary of the relevant activity under s.7 authorisations. If the request is in broad terms,
it is particularly crucial that the Secretary of State has a clear understanding of the range
of activity that is contemplated. For the renewal process, the FCO provides a summary of
the operations conducted but does not provide a full register of the activity carried out.
The FCO receives monthly summaries from GCHQ and SIS of this activity, although these are
not entirely consistent between the intelligence agencies. GCHQ, for instance, highlights all
new, reviewed and deleted approvals under class authorisations, whilst SIS summarise all the
submissions and warrants signed by the Foreign Secretary. SIS provides three or six monthly
updates on specific operations, as requested by the FCO, and GCHQ sends a record of any
legally privileged material that has been obtained during the course of relevant operations.
FCO directors conduct an annual Strategic Risk Assessment with GCHQ and SIS operational
directors and mission leads, addressing how operations are delivering on key mission areas.
An SIS officer is seconded to the FCO, to ensure the reports are considered by the correct
officials and to report back on any issues that arise, to ensure they are properly addressed.
11.11
We were not satisfied that the FCO has demonstrated a sufficient challenge to the
submissions from SIS or GCHQ in this context, in particular when there is a lack of operational
details or intrusion considerations. We accept that the FCO is involved in the early stages of
an application for authorisation under s.7, and that this will lead to challenge at a senior level
in the FCO before the submission is sent to the Secretary of State. This has the result that
the FCO and the Secretary of State may have a greater level of knowledge of the operation
– including the risks and safeguards – than is caught by the formal documentation. In our
view, careful scrutiny by the FCO is a critical stage in this important process, particularly for