16
LIBERTY AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
communications to Europe”. All communications falling within the
specified category would be physically intercepted.
Secondly, the Secretary of State would issue a certificate, describing the
categories of information which could be extracted from the total volume of
communications intercepted under a particular warrant. Certificates were
formulated in general terms, and related only to intelligence tasks and
priorities; they did not identify specific targets or addresses. They did not
need to be more specific than the broad classes of information specified in
the 1985 Act, for example, “national security”, “preventing or detecting
serious crime” or “safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom”. The combination of a certificate and a warrant formed a
“certified warrant”.
The third stage in the process was filtering. An automated sorting system
or search engine, operating under human control, selected communications
containing specific search terms or combinations thereof. The search terms
would relate to one or more of the certificates issued for the relevant
intercepted communications link. Search terms could also be described as
“keyword lists”, “technical databases” or “The Dictionary”. Search terms
and filtering criteria were not specified in certificates, but were selected and
administered by State officials without reference to judicial officials or
ministers.
Fourth, a system of rules was in place to promote the “minimisation” of
the interference with privacy, namely how to review communications
intelligence reports and remove names or material identifying citizens or
entities whose details might incidentally have been included in raw material
which had otherwise been lawfully intercepted and processed. Where the
inclusion of such details in the final report was not proportionate or
necessary for the lawful purpose of the warranted interception, it would be
removed.
The fifth and final stage in the process was “dissemination”. Information
obtained by an interference with the privacy of communications could be
disseminated only where the recipients’ purpose(s) in receiving the
information was proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. Controls
on the dissemination formed a necessary part of Article 8 safeguards.
44. The applicants contended that since the section 3(2) procedure
permitted the interception of all communications falling within the large
category set out in each warrant, the only protection afforded to those whose
communications were intercepted was that the Secretary of State, under
section 6(1) of the Act, had to “make such arrangements as he considers
necessary for the purpose of securing that ... so much of the intercepted
material as is not certified by the certificate is not read, looked at or listened
to by any person” unless the requirements of section 6(2) were met.
However, the precise nature of these “arrangements” were not, at the
relevant time, made known to the public, nor was there any procedure