LIBERTY AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
15
• An assurance that all material intercepted will be handled in accordance with the
safeguards required by sections 15 and 16 of the Act [these last two bullets of course
are the equivalent to the last bullet point in 4 .2].
... By subparagraph 4(8), the s. 8(l) warrant instrument should include ‘the name or
description of the interception subject or of the set of premises in relation to which the
interception is to take place’ and by subparagraph 4(9) there is reference to the
schedules required by s. 8(2) of [the 2000 Act]. The equivalent provision in relation to
the format of the s. 8(4) warrant in subparagraph 5(9) does not of course identify a
particular interception subject or premises, but requires inclusion in the warrant of a
‘description of the communications to be intercepted’.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
41. The applicants complained about the interception of their
communications, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
42. The applicants complained that, between 1990 and 1997, telephone,
facsimile, e-mail and data communications between them were intercepted
by the Capenhurst facility, including legally privileged and confidential
material.
43. Through the statements of Mr Duncan Campbell, a
telecommunications expert, they alleged that the process applying to
external warrants under section 3(2) of the 1985 Act embodied five stages.
First, a warrant would be issued, specifying an external communications
link or links to be physically intercepted. Such warrants covered very broad
classes of communications, for example, “all commercial submarine cables
having one terminal in the UK and carrying external commercial