Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner - March 2015
Interception Errors
6.82 It is my duty under sections 58(2) and (3) of RIPA 2000 to report to the Prime
Minister any contravention of the provisions of RIPA 2000, or any inadequate discharge
of the section 15 safeguards.
6.83 In my 2013 report I noted that there was no provision for error reporting
in the interception of communications code of practice, unlike the provision in the
communications data code of practice. The interception agencies remain keen to report
any instances which they judge to be errors, but their thresholds for reporting differed
and there was a lack of consistency to the process. I am satisfied that progress has been
made here.
6.84 In early 2014 my office convened a meeting with a number of the interception
agencies to seek to establish a common understanding of what constitutes an error.
Realistic case studies were used as a stimulus for discussion. These revealed some common
ground, even though the agencies’ operational challenges are often very different. My
office has produced a draft memorandum of understanding as the basis for a robust
error reporting system. We have tested this against the errors that were reported in 2014
to ensure that it is sufficiently comprehensive. This should provide a clear and consistent
framework for error reporting.
6.85 In my 2013 report I mentioned concerns that some interception agencies delayed
reporting errors until they had investigated the cause. This year my office has been
provided with an early initial report of the error (or potential error) and a more detailed
report once the investigation was complete. This is a welcome improvement which is
codified in the memorandum of understanding.
Error Statistics
6.86 The total number of interception errors reported to my office during 2014 was
60, three more than in 2013. The breakdown of the causes of the errors is contained in
Figure 4
6.87 55% of the errors were attributable to the interception agencies, 2% to the WGDs
and 38% to the CSPs when giving effect to an interception warrant.
6.88 The remaining 5% of the interception errors were caused by CSPs providing police
forces with the content of communications when they only required communications
data under Chapter II of Part I, or, in one instance where a police force did not have the
necessary authority in place to access stored communications29. It is important to make
the point that this 5% did not relate to the issuing or implementation of interception
warrants.
29 See section 1(5)(c), 2(7) and 2(8) of RIPA 2000
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